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Our system, fostered by the Commerce Clause, is that every farmer ... shall
be encouraged to produce by the certainty that he will have free access to
every market in the Nation, that no home embargoes will withhold his ex-
ports, and no foreign state will by customs duties or regulations exclude them.
Likewise, every consumer may look to the free competition from every produc-
ing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Laws dealing with agriculture have generated a great deal of con-
stitutional law.2 This Article explores one more recent example. Cor-
porate-farming laws are one hallmark of agricultural law. They
regulate the use of limited liability business forms for owning agricul-
tural land, engaging in production agriculture, or both on approxi-
mately 312 million acres of farmland in nine states. That is
approximately 77% of the land in those states and approximately one-
third of all farmland in the United States.3 These regulations gener-
ally take the form of restricting the use of limited liability to those
producers that the legislature or electorate have deemed "real farm-
ers" or "family farmers." This Article evaluates whether the "shadows
cast by the congressional commerce power"4 prevent a state from de-
fining for itself who Justice Jackson's farmers are. Stated simply, can
states give these farmers preferential access to the means of produc-
tion without violating the dormant Commerce Clause ("DCC")
doctrine?
Recent decisions from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals conclude
that states may not entertain this preference. One decision in particu-
lar, Jones v. Gale,5 casts a great deal of doubt on the continued viabil-
ity of state efforts to regulate the use of limited liability on
agricultural lands. 6 The most far reaching aspect of the Jones court's
1. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
2. Jim Chen, The Potable Constitution, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 1 (1998); see also West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 206 n.22 (1994) (noting that "[a]
surprisingly large number of our Commerce Clause cases arose out of attempts to
protect local dairy farmers").
3. 1 USDA, 2007 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, ch. 2, table 8 (reporting national total
and state level data). The 2007 Census of Agriculture is available at http:/l
www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/FullReport/index.asp.
4. Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., Beyond Purpose: Addressing State Discrimination in
Interstate Commerce, 46 S.C. L. REv. 381, 382 (1995).
5. 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006).
6. There are, of course, many other areas of rural law and policy that could be pre-
empted by Congressional silence under the DCC doctrine under the court's rea-
soning. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 70-1901-1909 (Cum. Supp. 2008) (providing
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analysis is its conclusion that Nebraska's corporate-farming law was
facially discriminatory. This Article argues that corporate-farming
laws like Nebraska's are not easily classified as facially discriminatory
under the DCC doctrine. As I explain below, Nebraska's law had, at
most, discriminatory effects.
Under the DCC doctrine, however, it is not possible to simply take
a well-worn set of rules associated with discriminatory effects and
critically evaluate Nebraska's law or the Jones court's decision. Thus,
this Article also examines the difficult doctrinal question of discrimi-
natory effects in an effort to better understand whether Nebraska's
corporate-farming law was discriminatory. In so doing, the Article
brings a level of synthesis to the Court's cases on discriminatory ef-
fects.7 The development of this aspect of the doctrine is obviously im-
portant to courts but, perhaps more fundamentally, it is important to
state legislatures seeking to understand the parameters of this far-
reaching restraint on their authority.8
special treatment for community-based energy development by providing special
treatment for projects that have a certain quantum of owners who are residents
of Nebraska).
7. This doctrinal effort, however, is limited to the pieces necessary to put together
the corporate-farming puzzle. Indeed, the DCC doctrine is one of the most notori-
ously complex bodies of constitutional law. DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 223 (2004). Enunciating the doctrinal rules at any
level of specificity is a challenging exercise that has occupied many scholars.
Treatise treatments include COENEN, supra, at 209-342 (2004); BORIS I. BITTKER,
BITTKER ON THE REGULATION OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE
§§ 6.01-6.08 (1999), including the Cumulative Supplement authored by Brannon
P. Denning; LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-1-6-23
(3d ed. 2000). Notable broader analyses include REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND
INTERSTATE COMMERCE (A. Dan Tarlock, ed. 1981); Brannon P. Denning, Recon-
structing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417
(2008); Brannon P. Denning, Confederation-Era Discrimination Against Inter-
state Commerce and the Legitimacy of the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine,
94 Ky. L. J. 37 (2005); Julian N. Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to
Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425 (1982); Michael A. Lawrence, Toward a More Coherent
Dormant Commerce Clause: A Proposed Unitary Framework, 21 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'y 395 (1998); Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protec-
tionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986); Michael E. Smith, State Discriminations Against Interstate Commerce, 74
CAL. L. REV 1203 (1986).
8. In this limited sense, the Article speaks to those primarily interested in the DCC
doctrine. After all, the continued development of the DCC doctrine should con-
sider the practicalities of its application. This Article provides one example of the
DCC doctrine's application and hopefully elucidates the operation of the larger
doctrine. In this sense it is "concerned with judicial generation of rules that im-
plement or enforce constitutional meaning," which some have recently termed
"new doctrinalism." See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE
CONSTITUTION 76-101 (2001); KERMIT ROOSEVELT III, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL Ac-
TIVISM 22-36 (2006); Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA.
L. REV. 1 (2004); Brannon P. Denning, The New Doctrinalism in Constitutional
Scholarship and District of Columbia v. Heller, 75 TENN. L. REV. 789 (2008); Den-
[Vol. 88:50
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The necessary background is set forth in Part II, below. Part III
evaluates the complex question of whether Nebraska's law had dis-
criminatory effects for purposes of the DCC doctrine. The DCC doc-
trine's discriminatory effects rule generally prohibits a regulating
state from placing outsiders at a competitive disadvantage relative to
insiders. Three subsidiary tasks follow from this general rule. First,
one must identify the relevant market and its competitors. Second,
one must identify the relevant competitive advantage at issue. Fi-
nally, one must evaluate whether the regulating state bestows that
competitive advantage on insider and outsider competitors in a dis-
criminatory manner.
The first three sections of Part III explore these three tasks. Sec-
tion III.A identifies the relevant markets in which Nebraska's law op-
erated and the competitors affected by Nebraska's law within those
markets. Section III.B identifies the competitive advantage at issue
when a state regulates the use of the corporate form. Section III.C
takes on the third task in three subsections. Subsection III.C.1 deals
with an unanswered doctrinal question. Because the DCC doctrine's
anti-discrimination rule protects competing market participants from
discriminatory treatment based on insider-outsider status, I attempt
to answer a seemingly simple question: "What makes an insider an
insider and what makes an outsider an outsider for purposes of the
DCC doctrine?" After addressing a few possible alternatives, I settle
on residency and evaluate whether Nebraska's corporate-farming law
treated resident and non-resident competitors differently.
Subsection III.C.2 focuses primarily on the text and operation of
Nebraska's law, discussing the impact of its interpretation and opera-
tion on the question of discriminatory effect. The Jones court em-
ployed a narrow interpretation of Nebraska's corporate-farming law
that was central to its discrimination conclusion. I conclude that a
broader interpretation would eliminate the existence of discrimina-
tion. However, even under the narrow interpretation, the Jones court
employed an imprecise look at what Nebraska's law did and how it did
it. A closer look at what Nebraska's law allowed qualifying operations
to do reveals a colorable, though perhaps unconvincing, argument that
it had no discriminatory effect.
While this more demanding examination draws the Jones court's
analysis into question, it also exposes a further doctrinal question. If
one accepts residency as the determinant of insider-outsider status,
and if one employs the Jones court's narrow interpretation of Ne-
ning, supra note 7 at 424-27; Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the
Constitution, 111 HARv. L. REV. 54 (1997); David L. Franklin, Facial Challenges,
Legislative Purpose, and the Commerce Clause, 92 IoWA L. REV. 41, 95-97 (2006);
Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller's Future in the Lower Courts,
102 Nw. U. LAw REV. 2035, 2042 n.33 (2008).
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braska's law, then Nebraska's law at most prevented some (but not
all) outsiders from using the corporate form, while allowing some (but
not all) insiders with the ability to use it. Subsection III.C.3 therefore
explores whether and when this sort of treatment constitutes discrimi-
nation. In so doing, I reap a set of rules from the Court's DCC cases
that helps explain when the Court is willing to deem the effects of a
state's law discriminatory. As I glean those rules, I apply them to Ne-
braska's law, providing further support for the notion that corporate-
farming laws do not easily qualify as discriminatory. This analysis
concludes that the farm-residency requirement Nebraska used was
discriminatory, but that Nebraska's active-engagement requirement
was not.
In section III.D, I take a step back and evaluate the prospect of
discriminatory effects within the feeding-services market. While the
presence of discriminatory effects within other markets may be possi-
ble, my analysis shows that a look at the feeding-services market
reveals no discriminatory effects.
The challenge of conducting this sort of a study is evident from the
length of this Article. It deals with a somewhat complex state-law re-
striction operating within a diverse agricultural industry, while at the
same time evaluating that law under a notoriously complex body of
unsettled doctrine that, at times, needs further development. And it
does this in response to a particular court's disposition of the issue.
But complexity is far from atypical in DCC challenges. So I have re-
sisted the temptation to oversimplify the DCC doctrine and corporate-
farming measures in favor of a thorough analysis of both. In the end,
this exercise sheds a great deal of light in the shadows of Congress'
power to regulate commerce and states' ability to provide favorable
treatment to those that it deems farmers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Nebraska's Corporate-Farming Restriction
Nebraska's measure 9 was adopted in 1982 as an amendment to the
Nebraska State Constitution.1O "Initiative 300" (or "1-300") was
placed on the ballot by popular initiative after various attempts at
9. For a broader discussion of corporate-farming restrictions, placing Nebraska's in
context with other states' laws and canvassing the various policy rationales for
these laws, see Anthony B. Schutz, Corporate Farming Measures in a Post-Jones
World, __ DRAKE J. AG. LAw _ (forthcoming 2009).
10. Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., 259 Neb. 407, 412, 610 N.W.2d 420, 426 (2000); see
also, Patricia Pansing Brooks, Note, An Equal Protection Analysis of the Classifi-
cations in Initiative 300: The Family Farm Amendment to the Constitution of the
State of Nebraska, 62 NEB. L. REv. 770, 778-86 (1983) (examining the history
preceding Nebraska's adoption); Nancy L. Thompson, Initiative 300 After 20
Years, NEBRASKA LAWYER, Oct. 2001, at 6, 6-10.
[Vol. 88:50
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regulating corporate farming had failed in the Nebraska legislature."
Nebraska's measure created a general rule that prohibited corpora-
tions 12 from owning or acquiring an interest in 13 agricultural land.14
In addition, Nebraska's law prohibited corporations from engaging in
farming or ranching.15 Farming or ranching was defined as "(i) the
cultivation of land for the production of agricultural crops, fruit, or
other horticultural products, or (ii) the ownership, keeping or feeding
of animals for the production of livestock or livestock products."16 The
The discussion below covers the relevant DCC traits of Nebraska's restriction.
There are, of course, further details. For example, trusts created for the benefit
of family members are dealt with in its provisions and, generally speaking, the
ownership must not be layered among entities. The focus of this Article, how-
ever, is on Nebraska's qualifying activities and their geographic implications.
Those aspects of Nebraska's law implicate the DCC doctrine.
11. Brooks, supra note 10, at 779-80 (collecting prior legislative efforts and Attorney
General Opinions).
12. I use the term corporation with some liberty here and throughout the Article.
Nebraska's law restricted the use of all business forms that involved limited lia-
bility. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1) ("No corporation or syndicate shall acquire, or
otherwise obtain an interest, whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any title
to real estate used for farming or ranching in this state, or engage in farming or
ranching."); id. (defining syndicate as "any limited partnership organized under
the laws of any state of the United States or any country, other than limited
partnerships in which the partners are members of a family, or a trust created for
the benefit of a member of that family, related to one another within the fourth
degree of kindred according to the rules of civil law, or their spouses, at least one
of whom is a person residing on or actively engaged in the day to day labor and
management of the farm or ranch, and none of whom are nonresident aliens.
This shall not include general partnerships.");NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2602(2) (Reis-
sue 1997) (defining prohibited "syndicates" for purpose of the corporate-farming
measure to include limited liability companies); accord Bruce Johnson, Corporate
Restrictions in U.S. Production Agriculture: Economic Implications, J.AM Soc'Y
FARM MANAGERS AND RURAL APPRAISERS, Fall 1995, at 26, Table 2.
13. This Article uses the term "owning" to simplify matters somewhat. In reality, the
restrictions apply to various levels of ownership interests that the corporation
may acquire. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1) (prohibited entity may not "acquire, or
otherwise obtain an interest, whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any title
to real estate used for farming or ranching in this state"). To make matters more
complex Nebraska's law contained exceptions for encumbrances that one could
classify as ownership interests. See NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1)(L) ("These re-
strictions shall not apply to .... A bona fide encumbrance taken for purposes of
security.").
14. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1) (prohibited entity may not "acquire, or otherwise ob-
tain an interest, whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any title to real estate
used for farming or ranching in this state").
15. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1) (prohibited entity may not "engage in farming or
ranching").
16. The prohibition on farming could operate to protect some producers from over-
reaching corporate participants. See Fred L. Morrison, State Corporate Farm
Legislation, 7 U. TOL. L. REV. 961, 993-94 (1975-76). For instance, a corporate
entity that made decisions for other farmers through the use of production con-
tracts could be "engaged in farming." Such a corporation's activities would there-
fore run afoul of the corporate-farming law. Research has not revealed cases in
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:50
two notions, however, were related because the restriction on land
ownership applied to land used for farming.17 Thus, the definition of
farming helped define what lands were subject to the ownership
restriction.18
Despite the general rule prohibiting all corporate farming and
farmland ownership, Nebraska's law contained various exceptions.
The relevant exception for DCC purposes was the exception for a "fam-
ily farm or ranch corporation."19 There were two main qualifications
for this exception: (1) the entity had to have the correct ownership
structure; and (2) a qualified individual had to perform certain quali-
fying activities. The ownership-structure qualification exhibited a
preference for familial ownership. Thus, Nebraska's provision identi-
fied such corporations as those in which "the majority of the voting
stock is held by members of a family. .. related to one another within
the fourth degree of kindred according to the rules of civil law, or their
spouses."20
The second qualification required that a family member, or per-
haps a family member owning shares of the entity2 i-a qualified indi-
vidual-perform certain qualifying activities. There were two such
activities: the individual had to be "[1] residing on or [2] actively en-
which this theory has been pursued under a corporate-farming restriction in Ne-
braska or any other state. A more likely source of relevant restrictions in this
regard would be statutory limitations on production contracts. Neil D. Hamilton,
State Regulation of Agricultural Production Contracts, 25 U. MEMPHIS L. REV.
1051 (1995); Neil D. Hamilton, Why Own the Farm If You Can Own the Farmer
(and the Crop)?, 73 NEB. L. REV. 48 (1994); Doug O'Brien, Policy Approaches to
Address Problems Associated With Consolidation and Vertical Integration in Ag-
riculture, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 33, 34-35 (2004).
17. "No corporation or syndicate shall acquire, or otherwise obtain an interest,
whether legal, beneficial, or otherwise, in any title to real estate used for farming
or ranching in this state, or engage in farming or ranching." NEB. CONST. art.
XII, § 8(1) (emphasis supplied).
18. Lands not placed in agricultural use were not, however, restricted. See Roger D.
Colton, Old Macdonald (Inc.) Has a Farm . .. Maybe or Nebraska's Corporate
Farm Ban: Is It Constitutional, 6 U. ARK. LITTLE RoCK L. J. 247, 254 (1983).
Thus, a corporation could own land in Nebraska and, for example, use it as a
park.
19. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1)(A).
20. Id.; accord NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1) (defining prohibited "syndicates" to ex-
clude limited partnerships when all partners have the same familial relation-
ship); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2602(2) (Reissue 1997) (defining prohibited
"syndicates" for purpose of the corporate-farming measure to exclude limited lia-
bility companies in which all members have the same familial relationship).
21. Nebraska's law was unclear in this regard. Its terse "at least one of whom" refers
either to members of the family identified within the exception or to family mem-
bers owning shares of the entity. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1)(A).
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gaged in the day to day labor and management of the farm or
ranch."2 2
Residency is a familiar legal concept, but the specific type of resi-
dency required here-"residing on . . . the farm or ranch"-is more
circumscribed than state residency. Active engagement is a bit more
difficult to pin down. The general thrust of this part of the qualifica-
tion criteria was to require that the qualifying individual farm. But
farming is difficult to define; there is no single answer to the question
of what it means to farm. At a strict level, the definition could require
that the qualifying individual personally perform all of the farm's la-
bor and make all decisions related to the operation. At a more relaxed
level, one could define farmers as those whose contributions to the op-
eration are exposed to production risk.23 In between these extremes,
there are various levels of involvement that a state could conclude sep-
arate those who farm from those who do not.
The Nebraska Supreme Court has interpreted the qualifying-activ-
ities criteria narrowly. In Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc.,24 the court ap-
plied the qualifying-activities criteria to a corporation that owned a
hog confinement facility and concluded that the sole shareholder did
not perform the required qualifying activities. The sole shareholder
resided on a farm a few miles away from the facility, but the corpora-
tion did not own the land upon which the residency was located. And
while the shareholder appeared to manage the operation, 25 he was not
actively engaged in the day to day labor and management because he
did not perform the physical chores of the operation nor oversee the
performance of those activities. The court refused to allow the essen-
tial nature of the shareholder's activities to qualify the operation. 26
Rather, it concluded that "actively engaged in the day to day labor and
management" required "that the shareholder be involved in all as-
pects of the activity, whether it be labor or management, on a daily
basis." To the court, the phrase referred to the "activities that occur as
a routine part of the farm or ranch operation."27 Further, the court
22. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1)(A); accord NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1) (defining pro-
hibited "syndicates" to excluded limited partnerships when the qualifying indi-
vidual performs the same activities); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2602(2) (Reissue 1997)
(defining prohibited "syndicates" for purpose of the corporate-farming measure to
exclude limited liability companies in which a qualifying individual performs the
same activities).
23. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 1400.207 (2008). Part 1400 offers a set of regulations de-
signed to identify those farmers who are eligible for federal assistance under a
variety of agricultural programs.
24. 259 Neb. 407, 413-17, 610 N.W.2d 420, 427-29 (2000).
25. Zahn, the sole shareholder, was responsible for the business's administration, fi-
nance, personnel management, herd nutrition and feeding, herd health, mainte-
nance, and marketing. Id., 610 N.W.2d at 427-29.
26. Id. at 413-414, 610 N.W.2d at 427.
27. Id. at 414, 610 N.W.2d at 427.
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found that "labor" required physical activity or toil, while "manage-
ment" referred to the "mental and business activities of the opera-
tion."28 But, "[wihat labor and management activities will be required
depends in large part on the type of farm or ranch operation that is
being conducted." 29
Both of these qualifying activities must also occur in relation to a
specific place-"the farm or ranch." The interpretational possibilities
associated with "the farm" involve two extremes. On the one hand,
the farm may include all land owned by the corporation used in the
farming operation. This operational view of the farm would allow
qualifying activities to occur anywhere, and would serve to ensure
that the qualifying individual is actively engaged in farming or resid-
ing on a farm somewhere. A narrower view would regard each parcel
of agricultural land (or, perhaps, each noncontiguous parcel) as a sep-
arate farm upon which qualifying activities must take place in order
to qualify the corporation to own or operate that farm. Taken in light
of the qualifying activities, this view ensures that the corporation will
not own more land than its family members can farm or reside upon.
Thus, this parcel-based view limits the overall size of the operation
and-in conjunction with the qualifying activities and ownership re-
quirements-requires a close connection between firm ownership, the
family, the land, and the farming activities. It thus establishes that
these entities will be family owned and operated, at least beyond any
farms that are qualified through the residency criteria.
The operational view of the farm also establishes these traits, but
does not require as close of a connection to each farm within the opera-
tion. Thus, the only limitation on size that would emerge from an op-
erational view of the farm is that effectively imposed by the ownership
requirement.
Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., also sheds some light on what "the farm"
is.30 There, the sole shareholder of the corporation resided on "a farm"
28. Id. at 415, 610 N.W.2d at 428.
29. Id. at 415, 610 N.W.2d at 428. See also Bornhorst v. Budzik, 1990 WL 119348
(Minn. App. Aug. 21, 1990) (unreported) (concluding that an absentee landlord
was not "actively engaged in farming" for purposes of MINN. STAT. § 500.24(2)(b)
(defining an unincorporated family farm) where the landlord "(1) received one-
third of the crops; (2) paid for the taxes, crop insurance and minor improvements;
and (3) helped decide what crops were to be produced").
30. There are no cases from other jurisdictions on the subject, aside from one unpub-
lished opinion in Minnesota dealing with a related statute containing language
that did not restrict the qualifying activities to "the farm." In Federal Land Bank
of Saint Paul v. Wessels, 1989 WL 38400 (Minn. App. April 25, 1989) (unre-
ported), the court concluded that an owner confined to a nursing home may be
actively engaged in farming and an absentee owner/daughter may be actively en-
gaged in farming if she was "actively involved in financial or other aspects of the
farming operation that do not require her physical presence in Minnesota." Nota-
bly, the active engagement requirement for an unincorporated "family farm"
[Vol. 88:50
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three miles from the hog confinement facility that the corporation
owned. The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that this residency
did not fulfill Nebraska's qualifying-activities requirement. It is un-
clear from the opinion, however, why the court reached that conclu-
sion. The court appeared to indicate that it was because the
corporation did not own the farm upon which the shareholder lived;
thus, that parcel was not within the corporation's farming operation-
i.e., it was not part of "the farm."3 1 Such reasoning is consistent with
an operational view of "the farm" that requires common corporate
ownership. However, the court also included language in the opinion
indicating a narrow parcel-based view of the farm: "[Nebraska's corpo-
rate-farming law] requires that the shareholder must be on the farm
or ranch, either by residing on the site or being actively engaged in the
day-to-day labor and management."32
Both the site where qualifying activities must take place and the
nature of the activities required have important geographic implica-
tions. As I explain below, the geography associated with performing
these activities is fundamental to the DCC inquiry.
B. The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: A Brief Primer
The negative or dormant aspects of the Commerce Clause have
been a part of constitutional law for nearly two centuries. 33 While the
doctrine's development is interesting, the various twists and turns-
including local versus national subjects and the direct and indirect
under the statute at issue in Wessels reads "actively engaging in farming." MINN.
STAT. § 500.24(2)(b). The statutory language applicable to a family farm corpora-
tion in Minnesota requires that the qualifying individuals be "actively operating
the farm." MINN. STAT. § 500.24(2)(c). The latter raises geographic considera-
tions, much like those of Nebraska's corporate-farming law. The former is less
susceptible to such a construction.
31. "It is undisputed that Zahn owns all of the stock of the corporation and that at no
time did Zahn reside on the land owned by the corporation." Hall, 259 Neb. at
411, 610 N.W.2d at 426.
32. Id. at 417, 610 N.W.2d at 429 (emphasis added). The operational versus parcel-
based view of farming operation has arisen elsewhere. When the FSA recently
explained its consolidated regulations for direct loans, it chose to delete a pro-
posed regulation that would have included restrictions on noncontiguous parcels
of land in a single farming operation. "The agency concluded that there is not a
policy concern associated with operating non-contiguous tracts. The changing
structure of agriculture and increased urban uses of farmland in many localities
require some operators to farm widely-dispersed tracts in order to assemble an
economically viable operation." Regulatory Streamlining of the Farm Service
Agency's Direct Farm Loan Programs, 72 Fed. Reg. 63,242, 63,256 (Nov. 8, 2007).
33. COENEN, supra note 7, at 216-18 (tracking roots of doctrine to Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. 1 (1824), with the doctrine firmly adopted by the Court in Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299 (1851)); Norman R. Williams, The Commerce Clause and
the Myth of Dual Federalism, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1847 (2007) (tracking develop-
ment of the DCC doctrine).
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test34 -are largely beyond the scope of this Article. 3 5 The modern
DCC doctrine36 has developed two specific approaches that the sort of
regulation at issue here implicates.3 7 State laws that are discrimina-
34. COENEN, supra note 7, at 218-19.
35. One historical twist is marginally relevant to corporate farming restrictions. His-
torically, production was seen as something beyond Congress's power to regulate
under the Commerce Clause; and, thus, state regulation of production was be-
yond the scope of the DCC doctrine. See Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-23
(1888). Of course, the distinction faded and Congress's power was held to em-
brace production. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The correlating
extension of the DCC doctrine has not, however, resulted in different doctrinal
rules for state laws dealing with production.
For its part, the Court has rejected the notion that "commerce" ought to have
a narrower meaning in the negative sense than in the affirmative sense. Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Me., 520 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1997).
For commentary discussing the affirmative/dormant aspects of the DCC doctrine,
see Barry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurispru-
dence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000); Christine A. Klein, The Environmental
Commerce Clause, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (2003); Andrew I. Gavil, Recon-
structing the Jurisdictional Foundation of Antitrust Federalism, 61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 657, 660 (1993); Williams, supra note 33 (arguing that the scope of Con-
gress's authority under the Commerce Clause has not and should not define the
scope of inquiry under the DCC doctrine).
In the end, the scope of the DCC doctrine appears to be at least as broad as
Congress's Commerce Clause authority, and the modern doctrine appears to con-
tain no formal distinction between production and the ensuing commerce. See
BITTKER, supra note 7, at §3.01; Morrison, supra note 16, at 985-86 (noting the
relevance of the production cases to a Commerce Clause inquiry concerning cor-
porate farming restrictions, but stating that "modern constitutional law is not so
simple"); Williams, supra note 33, at 1867-69.
36. For broad descriptions of the doctrine see COENEN, supra note 7, at 220-22. Two
individual Justices hold unique views of the doctrine that I do not explore here.
Justice Thomas would strike the DCC doctrine from the Court's jurisprudence,
relying on the Privileges and Immunities Clause as well as the Import-Export
Clause of Article I to reign in States. See Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas,
the Import-Export Clause, and Camps Newfound /Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U.
COLO. L. REV. 155 (1999). Justice Scalia only agrees with the Court striking a
state law on stare decisis grounds and does not believe Pike review should be
conducted. See Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 384 (2003). This, in turn, appears to place more emphasis on the discrimi-
nation tier of the DCC doctrine. See David S. Day, The Mature Rehnquist Court
and the Dormant Commerce Clause: The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D.
L. REV. 1, 49 (2007). However, aside from Justices Thomas and Scalia, it does not
appear that the DCC is about to be jettisoned from constitutional law. See Jim
Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV 1764, 1784 (2004); Denning, supra note 7, at
99. Thus, I do not explore the arguments for and against the continued existence
of the doctrine.
37. There are two strands of the DCC doctrine that are not implicated by corporate-
farming restrictions. One strand deals with state and local taxation. In this
area, a specific test has been developed. See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977); COENEN, supra note 7, at 222. In the other strand,
the Court has struck down state laws that have an impermissible extraterritorial
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tory are tested under a "virtually per se rule of invalidity."3 8 Such
laws must "advance a legitimate local purpose that cannot be ade-
quately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives" 39 to
pass muster. Once discrimination is shown, the burden of proof shifts
to the state to justify its law.4O
Non-discriminatory laws are tested under a more flexible balanc-
ing approach set forth in modern form by Justice Stone in Pike v.
Bruce Church.41 That test charges the court with the task of balanc-
ing the "putative local benefits" of the state law against the burden
placed on interstate commerce. 4 2 The nature of the burden imposed is
relevant to the analysis, as is the absence of alternative means of
achieving the local benefits at issue.4 3 If the burdens on outsiders are
"clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits"44 the
state's law must be struck down. The burden of proof lies with the
challenger.
Most laws that remain in the Pike arena are upheld, while only one
discriminatory law has passed muster.45 Thus, one of the most impor-
tant, and vexing, issues in modern DCC jurisprudence has been the
initial fight about whether a state law discriminates. 4 6 Nebraska's
corporate-farming law was struck down under the anti-discrimination
test; thus, this Article does not evaluate Nebraska's law under Pike.47
reach. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v.
MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640-43 (1982); COENEN, supra note 7, at 272-77; Don-
ald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (11) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85
Mich. L. Rev. 1865 (1987); Michael J. Ruttinger, Note, Is There a Dormant Extra-
territoriality Principle?: Commerce Clause Limits on State Antitrust Laws, 106
Mich. L. Rev. 545 (2007); Norman R. Williams, The Foundation of the American
Common Market, 84 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 409, 412 (2008).
38. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 476 (2005) (quoting Philadelphia v. N.J., 437
U.S. 617, 624 (1978)).
39. Id. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).
40. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Au-
thority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007).




45. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986).
46. Williams, supra note 33, at 1906.
47. Notbly, the rejection of the early distinction between pfuducLion and ensuing
commerce, supra note 35, has been said by some commentators to open produc-
tion regulation up to inquiry only under the balancing approach. Williams, supra
note 35, at 1903. I do not pursue that possibility here because I have not found
modern courts employing the production/commerce dichotomy to alter the stan-
dard they employ in DCC cases. The existence of discrimination appears to be
the sole determinant of the ensuing standard under the modern doctrine. How-
ever, given the prospect of insider-outsider status being ascribed based on the
locus of production, see infra subsection III.C.1, perhaps discrimination can never
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Discrimination can be found on the face of a state law, from its
effects, or from the purpose of those enacting the law.4 8 Purposeful
discrimination has been a favorite tool of the Eighth Circuit in recent
years.49 Under that form of discrimination, all the nuance of deter-
mining the purpose of multi-member bodies emerges. 50 I leave dis-
criminatory purpose on the sidelines for this segment of the corporate-
farming/DCC doctrine game.5 1 Here, I take up the task of identifying
and evaluating the two other notions of discrimination at work in the
DCC doctrine.
There is, however, some overlap between discriminatory purpose
and discriminatory effect that deserves acknowledgement. At times,
the Court may implicitly combine a somewhat disparate allocation of
regulatory burdens with evidence of discriminatory purpose to trigger
strict scrutiny under the DCC doctrine. 5 2 Given the Jones' court's
conclusion that Nebraska's law was enacted with a discriminatory
purpose and had a discriminatory effect, 53 this aspect of the doctrine
is relevant. However, I address the question of discriminatory effect
alone because the Eighth Circuit rested its opinion on discriminatory
occur with regard to production. If that were the case, then Pike would apply.
However, there are alternative ways of conceptualizing insider-outsider status
that can be used to find discrimination. See id.
48. Jones v. Gale, 470 F.3d 1261, 1267 (2006); COENEN, supra note 7, at 224.
49. See South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 593 (8th Cir.
2003); SDDS, Inc. v. S.D., 47 F.3d 263 (8th Cir. 1995); Jones, 470 F.3d at 1269.
But see Walmart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1013 (E.D.
Cal. 2006) (collecting authorities and concluding "[i]n no Commerce Clause case
cited or disclosed by research has a statute or regulation been invalidated solely
because of the legislators' alleged discriminatory motives"); COENEN, supra note
7, at 224.
50. See Julian Cyril Zebot, Note, Awakening a Sleeping Dog: An Examination of the
Confusion in Ascertaining Purposeful Discrimination Against Interstate Com-
merce, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1064 (2002) (arguing that the standard from Mt. Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. Of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977), ought to be used).
I believe whether purpose, alone, is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny re-
mains an open question. See, e.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577,
586 (1937) ("motives alone will seldom, if ever, invalidate a tax that apart from
its motives would be recognized as lawful").
51. While courts and commentators continue to say that either discriminatory effects
or purposes can trigger strict scrutiny, more work remains to be done when con-
sidering the theoretical coherence of using either intent or effect as a trigger for a
strong legislative justification. See generally DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THE-
ORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 136-45 (1980); JOHN HART ELY, Legislative and Admin-
istrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205 (1970); Paul Brest,
Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative
Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 95 (1971); Theodore Eisenberg, Disproportionate Im-
pact and Illicit Motive: Theories of Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV.
36 (1977); Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1784 (2008).
52. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1244-45.
53. See infra, text accompanying notes 63-64.
[Vol. 88:50
2009] DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS UNDER THE DCC 63
effect as an independent form of discrimination-not as a condition
that triggered strict scrutiny because it was accompanied by discrimi-
natory purpose-and because the discriminatory effects portion of the
DCC doctrine appears to be in dire need of scholarly attention.
Additionally, I focus on discriminatory effect because delving into
the morass that is purpose analysis would make this Article unman-
ageable and tends to put the cart before the horse. For instance, pur-
pose may be nothing more than a judicially supposed legislative desire
to bring about a particular effect. Thus, as Farber and Hudec put it,
"When we talk about protectionist motivation, what we really mean is
that protectionist effect played a stronger causative role in the pas-
sage of the legislation than its purported regulatory benefits."5 4 Un-
fortunately, without some idea of the sorts of effects that constitute
discrimination or protectionism, speaking of purpose or motivation or
intent is largely incoherent. So, I have tabled the prospect of combin-
ing the types of discrimination within the doctrine to focus on effects.
C. Corporate-Farming Laws Meet the DCC Doctrine: Jones
Corporate-farming laws have been the subjects of numerous consti-
tutional challenges over the years. Each time they withstood judicial
scrutiny.5 5 However, the limitations placed upon states through the
54. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1439
(1994).
55. See Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, N.D., 326 U.S. 207 (1945) (upholding North
Dakota's act against a challenge under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV, and an Equal Protection challenge under the 14th Amendment); MSM
Farms, Inc. v. Spire, 927 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding Nebraska's law
against Equal Protection and Due Process challenges); see also State ex. rel. Web-
ster v. Lehndorff Geneva, Inc., 744 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (for
equal protection purposes, "the effect of the statute, which forms the rational ba-
sis for the classification established, is to prevent the concentration of agricul-
tural land, and the production of food therefrom, in the hands of business
corporations to the detriment of traditional family units and corporate aggrega-
tions of natural persons primarily engaged in farming"); Omaha Nat'l Bank v.
Spire, 223 Neb. 209, 229-32, 389 N.W.2d 269, 282-83 (1986) (upholding Ne-
braska's law against Equal Protection challenge and quoting Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242-42 N.5 (1984) for the proposition that "the
colonists in several States took steps to eradicate the feudal incidents with which
large proprietors had encumbered land in the Colonies .... Courts have never
doubted that such statutes served a public purpose" and quoting Asbury, 326 U.S.
at 214, for the proposition that "a state policy against the concentration of farming
lands in corporate ownership" is legitimate); State v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust
Co., 427 N.W.2d 307, 314 (N.D. 1988) (upholding North Dakota's law against
Equal Protection and Due Process challenges, concluding that the North Dakota•
measure's divestiture provisions had the purpose of "prevent[ing] the accumula-
tion of farmland and ranchland by such corporations"); State v. J.P. Lamb Land
Co., 401 N.W.2d 713 (N.D. 1987); Coal Harbor Stock Farm, Inc. v. Meier, 191
N.W.2d 583 (N.D. 1971).
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DCC doctrine have eliminated corporate-farming laws in South Da-
kota and Nebraska.56
The Eighth Circuit's decision in South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v.
Hazeltine,57 was based on the discriminatory purpose that animated
passage of a corporate-farming law added to the South Dakota Consti-
tution.5 8 Because the law was "motivated by a discriminatory pur-
pose,"59 the court applied the DCC doctrine's strict form of scrutiny
and concluded that alternative methods for achieving the policy goals
at issue-promoting family farms and protecting the environment-
meant that restricting the use of the corporate form could not pass
muster. 60 This Article focuses on discrimination outside of the pur-
A wealth of commentary describes these cases: Brooks, supra note 10 (evalu-
ating Nebraska's restriction and concluding that it should not pass muster under
the Equal Protection Clause); Matt Chester, Anticorporate Farming Legislation:
Constitutionality and Economic Policy, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 79, 88-91 (2004);
Colton, supra note 18, at 259-264; Matthew M. Harbur, Anti-Corporate, Agricul-
tural Cooperative Laws and the Family Farm, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 385, 389-91
(1999); Keith D. Haroldson, Two Issues in Corporate Agriculture: Anticorporate
Farming Statutes and Production Contracts, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 393, 406-09
(1992); Morrison, supra note 16, at 977-980 (describing how early cases elimi-
nated Equal Protection and Due Process challenges, but noting the prospect of
Commerce Clause challenges); William R. Phelps, Jr., Corporate Farming Stat-
utes, 2 WHIrrIER L. REV. 441, 459-61 (1979) (addressing Equal Protection and
Due Process challenges); John C. Pietila, "[Wle're Doing This to Ourselves": South
Dakota's Anticorporate Farming Amendment, 27 J. CORP. L. 149, 160-64 (2001);
Brian F. Stayton, A Legislative Experiment in Rural Culture: The Anti-Corporate
Farming Statutes, 59 UMKC L. REV. 678 (1990); Martin J. Troshynski, Note, Cor-
porate Ownership Restrictions and the United States Constitution, 24 IND. L. REV.
1657 (1991).
56. Predictions of how corporate-farming restrictions would fare under the DCC doc-
trine can be found in Alan L. Billings, Note, The Family Farm: Regulating Farm
Act Avoidance Techniques Through Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Pro-
duction Contracting, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 277, 298-301 (1981) (concluding produc-
tion contracting and family farm acts pass muster under Pike and Exxon); Colton,
supra note 18, at 264-70 (ignoring discrimination analysis entirely, but conclud-
ing that Nebraska's measure passed muster under Pike); David B. Gaebler & An-
drew J. Ogilvie, Comment, Proposed Anticorporate Farm Legislation, 1972 Wis.
L. REV. 1189, 1211-12 (1972) (concluding Wisconsin's proposed legislation would
not discriminate and would pass muster under Pike); Morrison, supra note 16, at
980-87 (noting the possibility of a discrimination analysis, but settling on Pike
and evaluating corporate farming measures under that framework); John C. Pie-
tila, "[W]e're Doing This to Ourselves": South Dakota's Anticorporate Farming
Amendment, 27 J. CORP. L. 149, 164-68 (2001) (predicting such laws pass muster
under Pike and Exxon); Troshynski, supra note 55, at 1664-72 (concluding that
Nebraska's law may not have passed muster under Pike).
57. 340 F.3d 583 (8th Cir. 2003).
58. South Dakota continues to regulate corporate farming by statute. S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS §§ 47-9A-1 through 47-9A-23 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
59. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d at 596.
60. Id. at 597. For a discussion of Hazeltine, see Kathryn Benz, Student Writing,
Saving Old McDonald's Farm After South Dakota Farm Bureau Inc. v. Hazeltine:
Rethinking the Role of the State, Farming Operations, the Dormant Commerce
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pose regime, so Hazeltine does not offer much analytical assistance. It
is worth noting, however, that the district court in Hazeltine found no
discriminatory effects and no facial discrimination associated with
South Dakota's law. 6 1
In 2005, the United States District Court for the District of Ne-
braska ruled that Nebraska's corporate-farming law was unconstitu-
tional under the DCC doctrine. 62 In Jones v. Gale,63 the Eighth
Circuit affirmed.64 The courts rested on two independent forms of dis-
crimination. First, as in Hazeltine, the courts concluded that Ne-
braska's law was enacted with a discriminatory purpose.65 More
importantly for present purposes, the courts also concluded that the
Clause, and Growth Management Statutes, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793 (2006);
Christy Anderson Brekken, South Dakota Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine: The
Eighth Circuit Abandons Federalism, Precedent, and Family Farmers, 22 LAW &
INEQ. 347 (2004); Matt Chester, Note, Anticorporate Farming Legislation: Consti-
tutionality and Economic Policy, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 79, 94-96 (2004); James C.
Chostner, Note, Buying the Farm: The Eighth Circuit Declares South Dakota's
Anti-Corporate Farming Amendment Violates the Dormant Commerce Clause:
South Dakota Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 11 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 184
(2004); Roger A. McEowen & Neil E. Harl, South Dakota Amendment E Ruled
Unconstitutional-Is there a Future for Legislative Involvement in Shaping the
Structure of Agriculture?, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 285, 303 (2004). The entire
fourth issue of the 49th volume of the SOUTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW is devoted to
Hazeltine. 49 S.D. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 599, 599-886 (2004).
61. 202 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1046-48 (D.S.D. 2002). The district court, however, struck
down South Dakota's law under Pike because it provided no exception for utility
corridors, thus burdening the interstate transportation of electricity. Id. at 1050
(relying on Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981)).
62. Jones v. Gale (Jones 1), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1088 (D. Neb. 2005). The court
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.
63. Jones v. Gale (Jones I), 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006).
64. Id. at 1271. The Eighth Circuit also addressed standing and severability issues,
but this Article focuses on the court's DCC analysis. An Americans with Disabili-
ties Act challenge was also successful in the district court. However, the Eighth
Circuit did not reach the issue and the matter remains open.
65. To make this determination in the context of a popular initiative, the courts
looked to the language of the amendment, the language presented to voters on
the ballot, as well as the "history preceding the adoption of Initiative 300" which
"bolster[ed] the plaintiffs' contention that discriminatory intent motivated voters
to adopt Initiative 300." Id. at 1269-70. That history included a television adver-
tisement in which the announcer stated, "Let's send a message to those rich out-
of-state corporations. Our land's not for sale, and neither is our vote. Vote for
Initiative 300." Id. at 1270. Notably, this campaign rhetoric arose in the context
of campaign disclosures that identified outsider entities as the source uf funding
for the campaign against the corporate-farming measure. Of course that does not
impugn the notion that this sort of speech may have caused voters to think in a
certain way, but it does provide an interesting context for how notions of discrimi-
natory intent can arise. In the end, a variety of interesting questions arise from
the court's fairly cursory treatment of "purpose" or "intent" or "motive" when that
intent is to be attributed to a legislative body of over 200,000 people at the sum-
mary judgment stage of litigation. Those questions, however, are beyond the fo-
cus of this article.
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measure was "facially discriminatory" because the family farm and
ranch corporation exception "on its face ... favors Nebraska residents,
and people who are in such close proximity to Nebraska farms and
ranches that a daily commute is physically and economically feasible
for them."66 The courts refused to consider the actual effects of Ne-
braska's measure, instead focusing on the text of the legislation. 67
While the district court did not discuss how "the farm" was to be
interpreted, it did realize that Nebraska's law was not perfectly dis-
criminatory against outsiders. Its qualifying activities allowed some
(but not all) insiders to use the corporate form because only state re-
sidents who lived on farms or were actively engaged would fulfil the
law's requirement. And it allowed some (but not all) outsiders to do so
as well because some qualifying individuals would be non-residents
who were actively engaged in farming in Nebraska. The district court,
however, rejected this as irrelevant, concluding that a law could be
"facially invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause, even when
such legislation also burdens some in-state interests or includes some
out-of-state interest in the favored classification."6 8 And the Eighth
Circuit agreed. 69
The Eighth Circuit squarely confronted the task of interpreting the
term "the farm" as it related to Nebraska's qualifying activities. The
state argued for the operational view of the farm before the Eighth
Circuit. But the court rejected that interpretation, concluding that
the canon requiring courts to employ reasonable interpretations that
avoid constitutional violations did not bind it to the operational view
because the operational view was an unreasonable interpretation of
Nebraska's law.7 0 To the court, the text of the amendment-regulat-
ing the ownership of land "in this state" and requiring qualifying ac-
tivities on "the farm or ranch"-were enough to deem the state's
argument a "heroic effort to develop a plausible alternative construc-
66. Jones 1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1081; Jones H, 470 F.3d at 1268. The district court
relied on another district court case, Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 241 F. Supp.
2d 978 (S.D. Iowa 2003), in which the court struck down an Iowa law that allowed
only cooperatives formed under Iowa law that were actively engaged in farming
to own or control pork production. Notably, the district court's opinion in that
case appears geared at the discrimination against cooperatives that were not
formed under Iowa law, not the geographic implications of Iowa's qualifying
activities.
67. Jones I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1078, 1082; Jones H, 470 F.3d at 1267-70.
68. Jones 1, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1081 & n.ll (relying on Fort Gratiot Sanitary Land-
fill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992); Dean Milk Co. v. City
of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951); Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891)).
69. Jones 1I, 470 F.3d at 1267 ("We do not think that an interstate commerce claim is
precluded by the absence of an express prohibition on non-resident ownership or
the fact that some Nebraska corporations ... may suffer a negative impact under
Initiative 300[.]" (citation omitted)).
70. Jones H, 470 F.3d at 1268-69.
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tion."71 Further support came from Hall, discussed above, as well as
the ballot's language, reporting that the measure would prohibit the
acquisition of agricultural land "by any corporation.., other than...
a Nebraska family farm corporation."72 Thus, the court concluded,
"the language of Initiative 300 plainly requires residing or working on
a Nebraska farm."73
As in Hazeltine, and as in most DCC cases involving the discrimi-
nation tier, Nebraska's measure could not be justified.
III. ANALYSIS
This analysis addresses the question presented by Nebraska's law
as one of discriminatory effect. While the Jones court relied on the
notion of "facial discrimination," its analysis is clearly not based upon
some explicit use of insider-outsider status in Nebraska's law.74 In-
71. Id. at 1268 (emphasis added).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1269 (emphasis added). Nebraska's enforcement history was not altogether
clear regarding whether it ever utilized the operational view of the "the farm."
One of the amici briefs sheds some light on the subject. Brief of Nebraska Bank-
ers Ass'n, Inc. et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees at 19-23, Jones v.
Gale, 470 F.3d 1261 (8th Cir. 2006) (No. 06-1308), 2006 WL 1652270. That brief
argued that the state had pursued enforcement against some corporations that
may have qualified for family-farm-corporation status under the state's interpre-
tation. The briefs argument was premised on, among other things, the word
"and" contained in a pleading that the state filed in an earlier enforcement action.
In that pleading, the state alleged that a corporation was not performing the req-
uisite activities on "Cedar and Knox County" tracts. Id. at p. 21 (emphasis in
original). The brief also argued that another pleading in a different action al-
leged that a corporation did not conduct the requisite activities on each of twenty
tracts of land that it owned. Id. at 22. From those pleadings, the brief argued
that the state had "staked out the position in prior enforcement actions that a
Nebraska corporation must satisfy the residency or day-to-day management and
labor requirements on each and every farm located in Nebraska." Id.
This argument is fairly specious because we do not know if the corporations in
question were owned by family members who worked or lived on some tract of
land that the corporation owned in another state. Moreover, these pleadings may
be consistent with what the state would have to prove to establish a violation
under its broad interpretation: No qualifying family-member met the require-
ments on any tract of land that the corporation owned. Thus, the pleadings cited
by amici may demonstrate that the state has sought enforcement consistent with
the operational view of "the farm." Wisely enough, the court did not rely on the
state's enforcement history in reiecting its "the fRrm" argument.
74. Facial discrimination usually involves a situation where the law "'artlessly dis-
close[s] an avowed purpose to discriminate.'" SDDS, Inc. v. South Dakota, 47
F.3d 263, 267 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S.
349, 354 (1951)). Looking to the effect of a law at least highlights how difficult it
is to separate the modes of discrimination, and it may skew the notion of "facial
discrimination." The parties stipulated that an effects analysis was not appropri-
ate for summary judgment because it was too fact-intensive. Jones v. Gale (Jones
1), 405 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1078 (D. Neb. 2005).
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deed, the Jones court noted that Nebraska's law contained no "express
prohibition" on outsiders, but nonetheless concluded that the measure
was "overtly" discriminatory. 75 Thus, the court appears to be saying
that facial discrimination can exist in cases where discriminatory ef-
fects appear from the face of the legislation.
That line of reasoning has support. Most courts have expanded the
concept of facial discrimination beyond those laws that explicitly men-
tion insider-outsider status.7 6 The Court, for its part, has found non-
explicit measures discriminatory using terms like "practical opera-
tion,"7 7 "practical effect,"7s and "as a practical matter."79 As Professor
Day has argued, the concept of facial discrimination has expanded in
recent years to encompass the use of discriminatory effect to bolster a
facial discrimination conclusion.S0 Professor Coenen carefully reclas-
sifies "facial" discrimination as "overt" or "patent[ ]."81 And within the
seemingly separate category of discriminatory effects, he summarizes
the Court's cases as decisions that "continue to suggest that an ill-
defined set of facially neutral state laws will trigger scrutiny more ex-
acting than deferential 'Pike balancing' review if their effects are dis-
tinctively or obviously destructive of interstate commerce. The
contours of this feature of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine remain
under-developed."8 2
75. See Jones 11, 470 F.3d at 1267-68.
76. See Jennifer L. Larsen, Student Article, Discrimination in the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 844, 863-65 (2004) (discussing the use of combina-
tions of "modes of discrimination" to find facial discrimination). Professor Collins
has argued that the distinction between facial discrimination and discriminatory
effects is misplaced, opting instead for a distinction between categorical and par-
tial discrimination, with this distinction corresponding to the different levels of
review courts employ. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitu-
tional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 80 (1988).
The Seventh Circuit is an exception. See Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608 (7th
Cir. 2008) (equating facial discrimination with explicit discrimination and evalu-
ating an Indiana law that, with regard to one provision, burdened only out-of-
state wineries under Pike). The analysis below indicates that this was a discrimi-
natory measure that should have been justified using strict scrutiny.
77. Best & Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 456 (1940).
78. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992); American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc.
v. Schneiner, 483 U.S. 266, 286 (1987); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336
(1979).
79. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 576 (1997).
80. Day, supra note 36, at 47-48.
81. COENEN, supra note 7, at 220.
82. COENEN, supra note 7, at 239 (footnote omitted); see also John M. Baker &
Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, "Drawn from Local Knowledge... And Conformed
to Local Wants": Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 38 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 6-16 (2006) (explaining the murkiness of dis-
criminatory effects). Interestingly, no commentator has sought to reconcile these
cases along lines that consider "facial" as distinguishable from "as-applied" dis-
crimination. If that is the distinction to be drawn, then the concept of facial dis-
crimination encompasses both explicit discrimination and discriminatory effects
[Vol. 88:50
2009] DISCRIMINATORY EFFECTS UNDER THE DCC 69
Here, I seek to develop the contours of discriminatory effects in or-
der to examine Jones and Nebraska's law. Given the court's case law,
it is fairly clear that discriminatory effects can be found even in cases
where a court purports to rely on the language of the law alone and
does not receive actual data concerning the law's impact. Whether
this discrimination is formally regarded as facial or in effect (as well
as what those terms may mean) is largely unimportant.
The DCC doctrine's anti-discrimination rule prohibits a certain
type of discrimination among competitors in a given market. Gener-
ally stated, discrimination in this arena consists of "'differential treat-
ment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the
former and burdens the latter.'"83 The anti-discrimination rule is
often characterized as a rule against economic protectionism-states
using legislation "to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening
out-of-state competitors."84 Beyond these broad statements, the finer
points of proceeding through a discriminatory effects analysis have
not been clearly set forth. At least four steps emerge from the general
rule against discrimination:
A) Identify the relevant market and the similarly situated com-
petitors within that market.
B) Identify what regulatory burden is imposed on these
competitors.
detected without evidence of actual impact amongst market participants. When
discrimination is detected from looking at data substantiating the actual impact
of a regulation in the marketplace, the conclusion may be that the measure has a
discriminatory effect. But that could be simply an "as-applied" method of finding
discriminatory effects. In any event, it appears that discriminatory effect can be
detected from the practical operation of the statutory language or, perhaps, from
data establishing the sort of allocations depicted below.
83. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S.
Ct. 1786, 1793 (2007) (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511
U.S. 93, 99 (1994); New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)).
84. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co.
of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988)). Protectionism is difficult to
define in a way that separates it from discrimination. Given the particular allo-
cation of burdens and benefits envisioned by the DCC doctrine, it would seem
that any discriminatory measure is, by definition, protectionist. But protection-
ism seems to be an ex-post judgment that ensues only after a discriminatory mea-
sure has been exposed to judicial scrutiny and found wanting. That is,
discrimination triggers review because such measures are often protectionist.
The ensuing scrutiny-geared at justification-tells us whether the measure was
protectionist. In this sense then, protectionism may be an intent-based conclu-
sion, reliably reached through the application of the rules implementing the DCC
doctrine. Of course, it could simply be a this-effect-is-not-justified conclusion.
For commentary discussing this interesting question, see Catherine Gage
O'Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination
Under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGo L. REV. 571, 587-88 (1997).
The canonical work on protectionism, which involves discussions of both protec-
tionist motive and protectionist effect is Regan, supra note 7.
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C) Evaluate whether that regulatory burden has been bestowed
upon the relevant competitors in a manner that constitutes
discrimination.
D) If discrimination is found, evaluate whether the discrimina-
tory treatment is justified.
Below, I proceed through the first three tasks in the context of Ne-
braska's corporate-farming measure. Justification is so unlikely with
discriminatory laws,8 5 that I will not take up the issue or the Eighth
Circuit's conclusions on that subject. Rather, the point here is to rig-
orously evaluate whether Nebraska's law was discriminatory and, in
so doing, generate doctrinal insights.
As a starting point, it is helpful to illustrate the steps of a discrimi-
natory effects analysis by constructing a figure. As step A indicates,
the initial effort is one geared at identifying a set of competitors
within a given market. This can be represented with a simple box:
Competitors in a Given Market
The outer boundaries of this box delineate the relevant market
and, more specifically, the similarly situated competitors within the
particular market. Once the regulatory burden is identified (step B), it
can be introduced as burdening a portion of this group. However, for
purposes of discriminatory effects, the central inquiry is how this bur-
den affects insiders and outsiders competing within a given market.
Thus, before introducing the burden to this figure, insider-outsider
status must be represented. This can be done by drawing a line
through the center separating insiders from outsiders:
85. COENEN, supra note 7, (noting that the scrutiny imposed is theoretically strict but
practically fatal).
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Competitors in
Insiders
Because insiders and outsiders will most often represent different
shares of a given market, the question of discriminatory effects often
turns on the question of proportionality. Rather than adjust the loca-
tion of the center line, this can best be represented with the introduc-
tion of an axis along the bottom of the figure radiating from the center
and depicting the percentage of insider competitors and the percent-
age of outsider competitors in the market. This, in turn, allows one to
depict the percentages of insiders and outsiders that the state's law
burdens (step C). The simplest example is a law that isolates outsid-







Here, the discrimination is perfect-the state has placed outsider




imposing a burden upon them. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,8 6
is an example that fits this illustration. In that case, New Jersey pro-
hibited the importation of waste into its landfills. The relevant mar-
ket and its competing participants (step A) were consumers of the
waste facilities' services. By banning the importation of waste, this
law divested all out-of-state consumers of the service offered by New
Jersey landfills (the relevant burden under step B) to the advantage of
in-state consumers. All outsiders were barred from accessing New
Jersey's landfills, while no insiders were saddled with this burden
(step C). The Court concluded this law was discriminatory.
Of course, this simple example is only a starting point. As I pro-
ceed below, a number of subsidiary questions emerge within each step.
For now, however, it provides a sufficiently workable framework
within which one can consider Nebraska's corporate-farming law.
Under this framework, the questions become (A) what is the relevant
group of competitors, (B) what is the burden at issue, and (C) was this
burden placed on outsiders in a discriminatory manner?
A. The Relevant Market and Its Competitors
The DCC doctrine looks for some market impact-some way in
which insider economic interests are made better off vis-A-vis compet-
ing outsider economic interests.8 7 Competition, of course, presup-
poses the presence of these interests in the same market.8 8
In the corporate-farming context, the courts have not identified
what market is at issue. There are two immediate possibilities: the
market for farmland and the market for agricultural outputs. The
market for farmland is obviously implicated by the restriction on who
may use the corporate form to own farmland. The law also restricted
who may use the corporate form to engage in farming-i.e., produce
commodities.8 9 Because a restriction on production necessarily im-
pedes the producer's ability to sell the product, Nebraska's law pre-
sumably had an impact within the market for agricultural products.
86. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
87. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003); General
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 (1997); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Cream-
ery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471-73 (1981); Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a
Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 75 (1988).
88. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1812; Tracy, 519 U.S. at 299; Regan, supra note 7, at
1095-96.
89. These commodities include the grain and livestock that farming operations pro-
duce. Of course, anyone could participate in the market for products as a buyer
and seller, but the restrictions operate on who may produce or how one may
structure the business that produces the outputs going to market. The corporate
farming restrictions have no impact on mere traders of these products, only
producers.
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With the markets narrowed to these possibilities, the relevant
competitors can be identified. Doctrinally, however, this aspect of the
inquiry is somewhat muddled because there is some uncertainty about
who or what the DCC protects. 90 Some cases state that the DCC doc-
trine "protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms,
from prohibitive or burdensome regulations."9 1 However, some cases
have recognized that "[t]he dormant Commerce Clause protects mar-
kets and participants in markets."9 2 And the Court is sometimes
vague: "The modern law of what has come to be called the dormant
Commerce Clause is driven by concern about 'economic protection-
ism-that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state eco-
nomic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.'"93
In the end, though, all cases dealing with discrimination appear to
be concerned with isolating the effect of regulation among some group
of competitors within a market.9 4 Commerce does not exist without
people or entities that produce, sell, or buy goods and services.9 5
Thus, distinguishing between an abstract notion of protecting the
market and protecting the people or firms who do commerce serves
only to needlessly complicate the analysis. For example, to say that a
law discriminates against outsider goods or services is in all cases to
say that the law discriminates against outsiders' goods or services. In-
deed, the Court's market participant doctrine-which allows states to
discriminate amongst those with whom it does business as a seller or
a buyer-also bolsters the notion that the DCC doctrine is geared at
participants. 96 Further, participants have a location within or outside
90. Eule, supra note 7, at 444 (noting the problem and resolving it in favor of the
actors in interstate commerce under Eule's process-based theory of DCC review);
O'Grady, supra note 81, at 584.
91. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978), quoted in Minne-
sota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 474 (1981).
92. Tracy, 519 U.S. at 300.
93. Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1808 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 273-74 (1988)). The Court's language is vague because it raises the question
of whether competitors are something different than economic interests.
94. See, e.g., Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003)
(refusing to evaluate a state law as discriminatory because it "will not impose a
disparate burden on any competitors"); Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1706 (1984) ("[In practice, discrimina-
tion against interstate commerce always turns out to be discrimination against
out-of-staters at one or the other end of the transaction.").
95. O'Grady, supra note 81, at 584.
96. See Davis, 128 S. Ct. at 1809; White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc.,
460 U.S. 204, 208 (1983); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980); Hughes
v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
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of a particular state's boundaries, which appear to be 9 7 the character-
istic protected by the DCC doctrine's discrimination rules. 98
Focusing on participants within the markets identified above cre-
ates four possibilities for the relevant groups of competitors affected
by Nebraska's law. Each market has a seller and a buyer.9 9 Within
the land market, there are sellers (land owners) and would-be buyers.
And within the agricultural-products market, the sellers are would-be
producers of agricultural goods who sell those goods to buyers.
Of these four groups, some can be eliminated from further consid-
eration. While there are finer points to discrimination that are dis-
cussed below, a broader point serves to eliminate some of the possible
groups of competitors at this point: discrimination may only exist
97. Detecting the relevant presence within or beyond that boundary is a question I
turn to shortly. See infra subsection III.C.1.
98. Looking to participants, however, presents at least one complication. Often the
discrimination or burden analysis that the DCC doctrine refers to is described as
discrimination against or an undue burden upon interstate commerce. This
brings to light a distinction between intrastate commerce and interstate com-
merce, which may not correlate with the geographic location of market partici-
pants. In most if not all cases, discrimination against interstate commerce
quickly becomes an analysis of whether a law discriminates against those who do
interstate commerce, in favor of those who do intrastate commerce. Taken in
that light, the matter is very close to discriminating against outsiders, in favor of
insiders. However, some insider market participants may do both interstate com-
merce and intrastate commerce. Is discrimination against such insiders discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce? The answer is yes, but it does not detract
from the notion of identifying insider and outsider participants. Usually such
insiders raise claims of discrimination based on how the regulation at issue af-
fects their counterparts in the market. As applied to insider sellers in interstate
commerce, for example, discriminating against them (for example by imposing an
export ban or providing favorable tax treatment to those who serve insider con-
sumers) really means that the legislature has preferred its insider consumers of
the product over outsider consumers, both of which purchase from the sellers the
state is regulating. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harri-
son, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (finding discrimination against interstate commerce
where a state property tax exemption applied only to in-state firms that served
primarily in-state consumers, because it favored insider consumers over outsider
consumers). In such cases, discrimination that adversely affects someone located
within the state doing interstate commerce is cognizable by looking elsewhere in
the market to some other group of competitors. Thus, looking at participants
does not deprive those insiders doing interstate commerce of protection. Rather,
the analysis simply shifts to the relevant participants. The insider interstate
seller is not an outsider. But that seller's buyer is the outsider that is protected
by the DCC doctrine against discrimination that favors competing insider buyers.
99. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 670 (2003) (refusing
to strike down a state law that taxed drug manufacturers and distributed the
revenue to pharmacists because manufacturers did not compete with pharma-
cists); Smith, supra note 7, at 1225-28 (concluding that the inequality must be
between competitors); see Regan, supra note 7, at 1096 ("[Plroducers compete
with producers, . . . workers compete with workers, distributors compete with
distributors, consumers compete with consumers, and so on.").
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when a state's law disfavors outsiders. That is, discriminatory treat-
ment requires that a state place outsiders at a competitive disadvan-
tage relative to their insider competitors. If a state were to place
outsiders at a relative competitive advantage, even explicitly, the DCC
doctrine would conclude discrimination does not exist. Unlike Equal
Protection jurisprudence, discrimination in the DCC doctrine does not
place a competitor's status as an insider or an outsider beyond legisla-
tive or administrative cognizance (except when justified). Rather, it
prohibits only relative hostility toward outsiders.1 0 0
Given the necessity of this general allocation of benefits and bur-
dens, it would be extraordinarily difficult to claim that corporate-
100. The Court's garbage cases are good examples of the general notion that discrimi-
nation involves the burdensome treatment of outsiders. This results from identi-
fying the relevant classes of insiders and outsiders competing with one another.
See COENEN, supra note 7, at 225 (noting that these cases can be framed as either
restrictions on the importation of waste or the exportation of waste-disposal
services).
Some of these restrictions can be seen as barring the importation of waste
from outsider waste producers. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't
of Natural Res. 504 U.S. 353 (1992); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617 (1978). These provisions benefit outside landfills in terms of the demand for
their services because, assuming some waste was shipped into the legislating
state, they increase the demand for outsider facilities. Similarly, insider landfills
are burdened because they experience a loss in demand. Insider waste producers
may benefit from decreased demand for their insider landfill's service, and out-
sider waste producers are burdened by the withdrawal of that service from the
interstate market. The constitutionally objectionable allocation in this market
appears to be between insider and outsider waste producers (i.e., consumers of
the waste service). Environmentally speaking, the constitutionally objectionable
allocation translates into a state hoarding its landfill space for use by its re-
sidents and not others, much like an export ban. Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Vir-
ginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923) (striking down a law allowing the sale of natural gas by
private in-state firms only after local needs were satisfied); see generally COENEN,
supra note 7, at 226 (collecting hoarding cases). Landfills, however, as market
participants, are burdened by these measures in a non-objectionable sense: out-
siders benefit while insiders are burdened.
Restrictions that require local waste producers to send their waste only to a
local facility, like those in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994),
are a bit different if they do not restrict a landfill's ability to receive outsider
waste. Outsider waste producers (consumers of the landfill's services) may bene-
fit from the withdrawal of local waste from the interstate market for waste dispo-
sal services. And insider waste producers may be burdened by the forced
disposition of their product. But the constitutionally objectionable allocation
arises as between insider and outsider landfills. Insider landfills benefit from the
guaranteed supply of waste, and outsider landfills may be burdened by the de-
creased supply of waste.
Thus, regulating the flow of waste (mandating local disposal or barring out-
sider imports) has an economic effect within two different sets of insider-outsider
interests. For import restrictions, the constitutionally objectionable allocation is
between insider and outsider waste producers. For local disposal requirements,
the constitutionally objectionable allocation is between insider and outsider
landfills.
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farming measures discriminate against outsider buyers of agricultural
products. Regulating how producers may structure their operations
does not disrupt the flow of agricultural goods to consumers in some
discriminatory way. If, for example, restricting the use of the corpo-
rate form increases an operation's production costs, the extent to
which those costs can be passed along to buyers will depend upon the
conditions in multi-national markets for the commodities. It would
seem highly unlikely that the increased cost could be passed on at
higher levels to outsider buyers than insider buyers. Indeed, the pro-
ducers' claims in Jones were not based upon discrimination affecting
to whom they could sell. Rather the claims were grounded in the abil-
ity to produce within the state. Thus, buyers in this market can be
eliminated from further consideration.
Three relevant groups of competing market participants remain:
(1) sellers of agricultural land; (2) buyers of agricultural land; and (3)
producers of agricultural products. Of these, sellers of agricultural
land can be eliminated. As applied to land sellers, Nebraska's law af-
fected the market for their land by restricting to whom they could sell.
That is, it hindered buyers' ability to use the corporate form to own
the land, which, in turn, may have diminished the number of willing
buyers. As applied to land sellers, the burdens fall on insiders.1o1 In-
deed, if we expand the relevant market beyond the state's borders-as
we should if we are dealing with interstate commerce-outsider sell-
ers in this market may benefit from the burden Nebraska imposed on
its sellers. Such treatment is not constitutionally problematic. Thus,
this group of sellers can be eliminated as a group of competitors
within which discrimination may have occurred.
101. See Morrison, supra note 16, at 996 (noting that if the laws are successful in
stabilizing the price of land "they will be simply penalizing one segment of the
agricultural community to benefit another. The effective losers will be retiring
farmers, or the heirs of deceased farmers, who will be receiving less for their
property than otherwise would have been the case").
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Two groups of competitors remain:1O2 buyers of agricultural land,
and producers/sellers of agricultural products.1O3 The next step is to
102. Within these groups, one may be able to argue that the competitors burdened by
corporate-farming measures are not similarly situated to those who are not bur-
dened-i.e., those burdened do not belong in the same box as those who are not.
Recently, the Court has been willing to entertain this argument. Dep't of Reve-
nue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008); United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 127 S. Ct. 1786, 1799 (2007) (Scalia, J., con-
curring in judgment); General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298 (1997);
see Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 602
(1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Such an argument for corporate-farming restric-
tions would basically take the form of arguing that those operations that do not
satisfy the qualifying criteria are different than those operations that do. If such
a classification can be made when identifying similarly situated competitors,
then there would be no discrimination within the classes-different competitors
would simply be treated differently. While the argument is interesting, how
much traction this step has with the Court in instances where the relevant par-
ticipants are all private-sector competitors is far from clear. Thus, I leave the
identification of the relevant groups of similarly situated competitors at these two
groups.
103. These two economic activities do not occupy the same formal categories within
the Court's "active" Commerce Clause jurisprudence. Land ownership and pro-
duction may be cognizable subjects of Congressional regulation through the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause. See BIrKER, supra note 7, §§ 3.01, 5.01[B]. If the
shadow of the Commerce Clause defines the scope of operation for the DCC doc-
trine, then one might be able to argue that those activities within the penumbra
of Congressional authority ought to be treated differently (or perhaps not at all)
under the DCC doctrine. Cf. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 520 U.S. at 609
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court's invalidation of a state statute
providing a property tax exemption to those facilities that served mostly state
residents created a "'dormant' Necessary and Proper Clause to supplement the
'dormant' Commerce Clause"); BIrrER, supra note 7, § 6.01[C] (quoting Hill v.
Florida, 325 U.S. 538, 544 (1945) (Stone, C.J., concurring), and citing United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941)), for the notion of considering the his-
toric distinction between "activities affecting commerce" (like "agriculture, manu-
facturing, and mining") and "interstate commerce" as "a force in applying the
dormant Commerce Clause to vital aspects of state regulations"). Indeed, if Nec-
essary and Proper Clause jurisprudence is premised on deference to Congress,
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414-16 (1819), then one could
ask why Congressional silence receives little deference in the DCC doctrine, even
though such silence could be taken as a Congressional judgment that the subject
is not appropriate for federal commercial regulation. Such an argument, how-
ever, must await another day.
Necessary and Proper Clause aside, the question of whether land ownership
falls within the scope of Congressional power, and thus the DCC doctrine, has
raised an eyebrow. Morrison, supra note 16, at 981-82; Colton, supra note 18, at
266-68 (concluding that ownership of land is within Congress's Commerce
Clause authority); Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Com-
merce Clause: Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regula-
tions but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85 IowA L. REV. 1, 160 (1999)
(concluding a federal mortgage code would be within federal authority because of
the interstate commercial nature of financing and sales); Troshynski, supra note
52, at 1665-66. Again, however, taking the present analysis into the complexi-
ties associated with the scope of Congress's authority must await another day.
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determine whether Nebraska's law imposed a relative burden on par-
ticipants within these markets.
B. The Competitive Advantage
Nebraska's corporate-farming law can be framed in two different
ways that are relevant to conceptualizing the burdenl0 4 it imposed
within the relevant groups of competitors: (1) it can be taken as a
restriction on corporations, or (2) it can be taken to restrict the busi-
ness organization choices of the individual participants in the market.
Thus far, I have framed the matter as a restriction on the ability to
use the corporate form. Under this frame, the relevant participants
are individuals who are restricted with regard to how they may com-
pete for land or engage in production. 0 5  If the corporate-farming
104. Whether a regulation is framed as providing a burden or a benefit does not mat-
ter, theoretically, or to the Court. See Brannon P. Denning, DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, State Investment Incentives, and the Future of the Dormant Com-
merce Clause Doctrine, 2005-2006 CATO SUPREME COURT REVIEW 173, 185-86;
Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Busi-
ness Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789, 814 (1996). The matter
may be different, however, with regard to direct subsidies. There, benevolence
may be what separates lawful and discriminatory subsidies from unlawful and
discriminatory tax breaks or regulation. See generally Dan T. Coenen, Business
Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 1002 (1998);
Edward A. Zelinsky, Restoring Politics to the Dormant Commerce Clause: The
Case for Abandoning the Dormant Commerce Clause Prohibition on Discrimina-
tory Taxation, 29 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 29 (2002).
105. Beyond this brief footnote and the next, I leave the Privileges and Immunities
Clause for another day. That is, I do not evaluate the propriety of these laws
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, nor do I seek to examine whether
the analysis here can be extended to that arena. Burdens imposed on individuals
based on state citizenship are cognizable under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV. The ability to utilize the corporate form, however, does not
appear to be within the scope of Privileges and Immunities Clause protection.
See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (stating
that the clause protects those rights which are "sufficiently basic to the livelihood
of the Nation"). Of course, one might be able to frame such a burden as a burden
on the ability to carry on a trade or own property. Under that frame, perhaps
protection would ensue. See id. at 386 (articulating protection for "commercial-
livelihood"). Nonetheless, the question of discriminatory treatment would ensue
and the analysis contained below could be applicable. It is far from clear whether
discrimination under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV means
the same thing as discrimination under the DCC doctrine. Compare United Bldg.
& Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221 n.10
(1984) (rejecting dissent's approach to discrimination as overly formalistic be-
cause it would allow subversion of an anti-discrimination principle simply by in-
cluding some residents within a burdened class), with text accompanying notes
165 to 169, infra (explaining that discrimination exists when some (but not all)
insiders are burdened along with all outsiders). See also Jones 1, 405 F. Supp. 2d
1066, 1084 & n.15 (rejecting individuals' Privileges and Immunities Clause claim
because Nebraska's law discriminated based on physical location, not state resi-
dency, and resolving the Camden similarity by stating that the city of Camden
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measure is framed as operating on corporations, then these measures
restrict market access-a restriction on who may buy or produce in a
the markets at issue. 0 6
The distinction between how one may structure her business (i.e.,
use a corporate form) and who may enter the markets at issue is
could have constitutionally required City employees or contract workers
"whatever their residence or citizenship might be, to appear for work in the city of
Camden").
Additionally, the standard employed may not be as strict as that employed
under the DCC doctrine. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 222 ("[The Privileges and Im-
munities Clause of Article IV] does not preclude discrimination against citizens of
other states where there is a 'substantial reason' for the difference in
treatment.").
106. Corporations are not protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV because they are not "citizens." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168,
177 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586 (1839); TRIBE,
supra note 7, § 6-37 at 1269-70 & n.99. If corporations were citizens, the ability
to own land would surely fall within the scope of the rights protected by that
clause.
Because of this exclusion under the Privilege and Immunities Clause, some
tout the DCC doctrine as a necessary supplement to the Court's treatment of
state laws impacting corporations. See TRIBE, supra note 7, at § 6-14 (classifying
the DCC doctrine as worth preserving, given the incoherence that arises from the
Court's treatment of laws adversely affecting out-of-state corporations); Martin
H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitu-
tional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DuKE L.J. 569, 610-12 (1987) (arguing that
the DCC doctrine should be supplanted by the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV and responding to the absence of protection by noting the possibility
of Congressional action protecting such entities).
One could add Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 211 (1945) (con-
cluding that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to the state power to
exclude a foreign corporation from doing business or acquiring or holding prop-
erty within it" and noting the "unqualified power of the state to preclude [a for-
eign corporation's] entry into the state" for such purposes) and W. & S. Life Ins.
Co. v. State Bd. Of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 667-68 (1981) ("[Wlhatever the
extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from doing business
within its boundaries, that authority does not justify imposition of more onerous
taxes or other burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic
corporations, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic corpora-
tions bears a rational relation to a legitimate state purpose.") to the list of confus-
ing precedent concerning discrimination and corporations that may justify the
use of DCC doctrine protections for such entities.
But despite commentators' statements that corporations should be protected
under the DCC doctrine, it is not clear what exactly this means, at least in the
context of a law that can be reasonably said to affect either the choice of business
organization or the ability of existing organizations to engage in a particular bus-
iness. In various settings we refer to restrictions on corporate activities as re-
strictions on the ability to use the corporate form to engage in the activity. But in
many settings, we protect corporations as persons. See, e.g., S. Ry. Co. v. Greene,
216 U.S. 400, 412 (1910) (equal protection); accord Brannon P. Denning, Why the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Com-
merce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L. REV. 384, 405-407 (2003) (discussing "the
corporations problem"); Redish & Nugent, supra at 611.
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troublesome because the nature of the burden changes depending on
the frame. That is, barring some entrants is more objectionable than
restricting how some entrants may structure their businesses. Under
Pike, the nature of the burden is quite important.107 But, it compli-
cates matters for different reasons under the discrimination rules.
For present purposes,1 0 8 the framing effect has an impact on what
competitive advantage is at issue. Barring outsider entities' access to
the markets at issue, while allowing insider entities, would definitely
inflict a burden on outsiders that benefits the relevant insider compet-
itors. In one part of its Jones opinion, the Eighth Circuit seemed to
frame the burden as operating on entities-"We have concluded that
Initiative 300 discriminates against out-of-state entities."1 0 9 But else-
where in the opinion, the court framed the restriction as barring ac-
cess to the corporate form. Thus, when it addressed the plaintiffs'
standing, (all of whom were individuals) it concluded that plaintiffs
had standing to challenge a law that "has a direct negative effect on
their borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning."110
Even if the burden is framed in this manner, however, it is difficult to
argue with the notion that the corporate form gives its owners compet-
itive advantages. These benefits include better access to capital, lim-
ited owner liability for entity debts, more flexible estate planning,
more favorable tax treatment, and limited entity liability for owner
debts."'1
Nonetheless, those benefits are not subject to easy generalizations.
For example, sufficient debt may be available to finance many opera-
tions.1 12 Similarly, the benefit of limited liability for the voluntary
107. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc, 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) ("The nature of that burden
is, constitutionally, more significant than its extent.")
108. Below, I examine a difficulty that ensues when identifying insider and outsider
participants raises under these different frames. See infra subsection III.C.1.
109. Jones 11, 470 F.3d 1261, 1270 (2006).
110. Id. at 1267 (quotation omitted).
111. See KEITH G. MEYER, ET. AL., AGRICULTURAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 49
(1985); Colton, supra note 18, at 248-49; C. William Eastwood, The Farm Corpo-
ration from an Income Tax Viewpoint: Friend or Foe?, 54 NEB. L. REV. 443 (1975);
Harbur, supra note 52, at 393; Stayton, supra note 52, at 691-92; Stuart B. Stras-
ner, Agricultural Corporations in Oklahoma, 16 OKLA. L. REV. 161 (1963); Eric
Melgren, Note, No Mere Yeoman: Incorporating the Family Farm-Considera-
tions and Consequences, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 546 (1985).
112. Indeed, a large chunk of federal policymaking is geared at making credit availa-
ble to farmers. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1921-2009ee-3 (2006) (providing various pro-
grams for extending credit to farmers). Interestingly, these programs often
involve eligibility criteria geared at identifying the family farmer. For example,
for farm ownership loans, 7 U.S.C. § 1922(a) provides as follows:
To be eligible for such loans, applicants who are individuals, or, in the
case of cooperatives, corporations, partnerships, joint operations, trusts,
and limited liability companies, individuals holding a majority interest
in such entity, must . . . (3) be or will become owner-operators of not
larger than family farms (or in the case of cooperatives, corporations,
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debts of the entity is fairly fleeting because personal guarantees often
accompany corporate debt in the agricultural sector. Whether a par-
ticular business organization will benefit the individual in tax or es-
tate-planning terms depends on a variety of factors in an individual
case. However, limited liability for non-voluntary obligations of the
firm may be a fairly common economic advantage for the owners and
their creditors. And lenders may also be more likely to lend money to
an entity (maybe in conjunction with a personal guarantee) because
the entity's assets will be shielded from the reach of the owners' per-
sonal creditors, at least to some extent. 113 But perhaps the strongest
support for the notion of an economic advantage in the corporate form
is the very existence of these business forms in the industry.
To summarize matters thus far, two different boxes depicting com-
petitors in given markets exist, as well as two different accounts of the
participants and the burdens imposed upon them. The relevant com-
petitors are buyers in the markets for farmland or producers of agri-
cultural commodities. Those buyers and producers may be entities,
individuals, or both. Nebraska's corporate-farming law can be con-
strued as burdening these participants by restricting an individual's
choice of business organization or as barring some entities from access
to these markets.
C. Discrimination
Under step C, the next task is to determine whether or not the
regulatory burden has been bestowed upon the relevant competitors
in a discrimatory manner. To answer this question here, one must
consider how Nebraska's law affected insiders and outsiders in these
markets. And, in order to undertake that task, one must first deter-
mine what differentiates insiders from outsiders.
partnerships, joint operations, trusts, and limited liability companies in
which a majority interest is held by individuals who are related by blood
or marriage, as defined by the Secretary, such individuals must be or
will become either owners or operators of not larger than a family farm
and at least one such individual must be or will become an operator of
not larger than a family farm or, in the case of holders of the entire inter-
est who are related by blood or marriage and all of whom are or will
become farm operators, the ownership interest of each such holder sepa-
rately constitutes not larger than a family farm, even if their interests
collectively constitute larger than a family farm, as defined by the Secre-
tary ....
Indeed, the USDA has incorporated state-law restrictions on entity operations
into its regulations implementing these programs. See 7 C.F.R. § 762.120(i), (j)
(2008) (containing eligibility criteria for guaranteed loans that require the entity
to be authorized by the state to own or operate farms under their control).
113. See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of
the Firm, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1335 (2005) (discussing the so-called entity shield as
more economically and historically significant than limited liability).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
1. Insiders and Outsiders
Before a state law's burden can be considered discriminatory
against outsiders, one needs at least some understanding of what dis-
tinguishes insiders from outsiders. The Court appears to regard in-
sider-outsider status as a person or entity's location relative to a
state's political boundary. The Court's general definition of economic
protectionism says as much: "regulatory measures designed to benefit
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."114
But there is no clear answer to the question of what makes economic
interests or competitors "in-state" versus "out-of-state." This issue is
fundamental to the DCC doctrine's anti-discrimination rule, but it has
received scant attention from courts or commentators.115 A coherent
account of discriminatory effects must address this question.116
Commentators often use residency without further inquiry, and
sometimes the Court does as well.117 But, as the district court in
Jones noted, discrimination in this setting is focused on the location of
one's economic interests, not his or her residency."1S For instance,
suppose I were a Nebraska resident who owns a farming operation in
Oklahoma. If my products originating in Oklahoma were barred from
the Nebraska market, or if my Oklahoma operation were prohibited
from consuming a product from Nebraska, I would presumably have a
claim of discrimination under the DCC doctrine. If I did have such a
114. Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1808 (2008) (quoting New Energy Co.
of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273-74 (1988)).
115. Smith, supra note 7, at 1219-20; cf Matthew Adler, What States Owe Outsiders,
20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 394-401 (1993) (explaining the duties of state leg-
islators with respect to citizens and non-citizens).
116. Pinning down the parameters of a protected trait is common to many discrimina-
tion claims, though it may go unnoticed. Disability discrimination is perhaps the
most salient example of an analogously difficult situation. What it means to be
disabled is a difficult question. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (defining "disability" as
used in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.3 (2008)
(listing various exceptions to the statutory definition). Gender, can raise similarly
difficult questions. See Zachary A. Kramer, Heterosexuality and Title VII, 103
Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 9), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1103095 (distinguishing between "sex," "gender," and "sexual orienta-
tion" and collecting sources), and race, see Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb,
481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987); Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613
(1987) (equating race-based discrimination with "ancestry or ethnic
characteristics").
117. See Best & Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 455-56 (1940) (concluding that a
state statute shielding "regular retail merchants" from a state tax was discrimi-
natory in favor of North Carolina residents because all North Carolina competi-
tors would qualify as "regular retail merchants").
118. Jones 1, 405 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1084 ("Initiative 300 does not discriminate against
[the plaintiff] as an individual based on his citizenship or residency, although it
does discriminate against out-of-state economic interests.").
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claim, then residency cannot be what distinguishes insiders from out-
siders in all cases.
An alternative method of determing participants' insider-outsider
status would be to attribute a location to participants based on the
location associated with their economic position in the market-the
location of the economic activity the actor performs that the regulation
burdens. For instance, when a measure discriminates against goods
or services produced outside of a state or locality, the matter is fairly
clear-the location of production determines outsider or insider status
which is, in turn, attributed to the market participants engaging in
that activity.119 Similarly, discrimination against outsider buyers in
favor of insiders (for example, by hoarding a resource) focuses on the
point of consumption, which is, in turn, attributed to the competing
buyers. 120 And, even in cases where goods aren't moving, the eco-
nomic activity can give us a relevant location. For instance, in-state
processing requirements favor those insiders who perform the particu-
lar function within the state over those who would perform the func-
tion outside of the state. 12 1 Thus, in many cases we can find a location
tied to an actor's commercial activity in the relevant market, which in
turn ascribes a location to that actor relative to the regulating state's
boundary.
What does this mean for corporate-farming measures? As ex-
plained above, there are two possible groups of competitors at issue:
buyers in the land market and producers/sellers of agricultural prod-
ucts. Within these groups, the inquiry should focus on detecting loca-
tions within the markets at issue that can be used to ascribe insider-
119. For instance, generating waste beyond a state's border is sufficient to vest out-
sider status to the waste generators which, in the market for waste disposal ser-
vices, are buyers. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Env'l Quality, 511 U.S. 93
(1994) (striking down a state law as facially discriminatory for charging a higher
surcharge on the disposal of waste "generated out-of-state"); City of Philadelphia
v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). Similar activities creating outsider status
include, the production of alcoholic beverages within or outside of a state,
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (striking down a Hawaii law
that provide a tax break to a narrow class of alcoholic beverages manufactured in
Hawaii), or the sale of such beverages from locations beyond the state's bounda-
ries, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (striking down Michigan and New
York laws prohibiting direct shipment of wine from out-of-state wineries, but al-
luwing direct shipment for in-state wineries).
120. See supra note 97.
121. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); South-
Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951)
(striking down a Madison, Wisconsin law requiring all milk sold within the city to
be bottled within five miles of the city's central square); Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385 (1948); Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928); Foster-Fountain Packing
Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890);
COENEN, supra note 7, at 228-31 (summarizing these cases).
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outsider status to the participants. In these markets, the question is
difficult because there are no goods or services moving across a state's
boundary. For example, with regard to land sales, ownership changes
but the land does not move. If the economic activity ascribes insider-
outsider status, one could argue that the sale of land always involves
insiders. Thus, by definition, there could be no discrimination that
places outsiders at a relative disadvantage. Nonetheless, there is still
interstate movement in a less tangible form. That is, the ownership
interest (or, perhaps, the incidents of ownership) moves beyond the
state boundary when the purchaser is located beyond the state's
boundary. But what does it mean for a purchaser to be located beyond
the state's boundary? Stated differently, what sort of location is suffi-
cient to vest that buyer with outsider status?
The most immediate response is residency. Another way of think-
ing of this is to substitute tangible personal property for the land. In
that case, we would have no trouble thinking of the buyers residing
beyond the state's boundary as outsiders, but we would attribute in-
sider-outsider status based on the receipt or consumption of the goods
beyond the state's boundary.
Out-of-state residency is not generally protected under this logic.
Rather, depending upon the particular market, the regulation affect-
ing that market, and the competitors' place in that market, residency
may work as a proxy for the location of one's exonomic interests rela-
tive to the state's boundary. For example, I am a resident of Ne-
braska. When I engage in economic activity, Nebraska may be the
place to locate my economic activity, but it will depend upon the par-
ticular market at issue and my place in that market. As a buyer of
goods, I am an insider relative to Nebraska's border if I buy and con-
sume the particular goods at issue in Nebraska. As a seller of goods I
produce within Nebraska, I am an insider because I produce the goods
in and, perhaps more relevantly, sell those goods from Nebraska. As a
processor, I am an insider because I perform that economic activity
within Nebraska. But in no case am I an insider or an outsider simply
because I reside here. Thus, if I were to produce goods in Oklahoma,
that would be sufficient to vest me with outsider status (relative to
Nebraska's border) in the market for those goods and allow me to
make a DCC challenge to Nebraska regulations discriminating
against me and my goods. So, my residency is a shorthand for my
economic interests because it correlates with my economic activity
within the state in which I reside. It does so in many, but not in all,
cases.
Early doctrine placed production beyond the reach of DCC doctrine
inquiry as preceding commerce. 122 While that distinction has faded,
122. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-23 (1888); see supra note 35.
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there has been little to clarify how a state's law could discriminate (if
at all) for purposes of the DCC doctrine when it regulates in-state pro-
duction. For instance, with corporate-farming laws there is little ar-
gument that these measures disrupted the flow of goods produced to
buyers in some discriminatory manner by favoring goods produced in
the state over competing goods produced outside of the state. How-
ever, a restriction on production is necessarily a restriction on the
ability to sell the product produced. If Nebraska, in effect, restricted
outsiders from producing in Nebraska it would necessarily restrict
outsiders from selling goods produced in Nebraska. But both produc-
tion and the ensuing sale (the economic activities at issue) reveal
nothing helpful because they both occur within the state. In one
sense, Nebraska's provision preceded production and sale by restrict-
ing who could engage in those, by definition, in-state activities. So
what makes these would-be participants insiders and outsiders?
Perhaps residency is a manageable way of distinguishing among
these participants. But it is quite unclear why residency should work
in this market. Focusing the inquiry on residency in the market for
land is compelling if one substitutes moveable property for land. With
production, one could question whether we should substitute some
sort of entitlement for the ability to engage in production. If not, then
perhaps in the corporate-farming context the only market within
which discrimination can occur is the market for land because it is the
only market that involves outsiders. But because restricting produc-
tion restricts the ensuing commerce, perhaps residency should be used
to determine insider-outsider status among producers. 12 3 At the very
least, however, residency appears workable for purposes of the land
market.
Settling on residency, however, does not end the complexity of in-
sider-outsider status. Residency raises a host of further questions be-
cause the term is not self-defining. Writ large, residency is simply a
way of identifying those who are sufficiently vested within a particu-
lar state for a specific purpose. Depending upon the purpose, resi-
dency involves different levels of attachment to a given state. If
residency were defined to require a certain number of days per year
within the state, it would appear to be a somewhat imprecise way of
attributing a location to the economic interests at stake. Many re-
sidents may have economic interests beyond a regulating state's bor-
ders, while many outsideis may have economic interests within the
state's borders. If residency were defined in a less demanding man-
ner, then the question would become one of selecting the appropriate
123. Notably, even if laws that regulate production qua production do not impact out-
siders for purposes of the DCC doctrine, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
would provide a non-discrimination principle to protect individuals. See supra
notes 102 & 103.
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quantum of ties to the regulating state. But the selection of any level
of connection would appear to be somewhat arbitrary when those ties
are unconnected to the market activity at issue. Why, for instance,
should a discrimination claim in either the land market or the produc-
tion market be made to turn on how many days one lives beyond a
state's boundary, let alone some other metric unconnected to the eco-
nomic activity being regulated? I am content, however, to rely upon a
vague notion of residency as a method for ascribing insider-outsider
status in these markets simply because it is a workable solution. And
the Court seems to equate an undefined notion of residency with in-
sider-outsider status at times. 1 24
But relying on residency raises further problems when it comes to
discrimination involving entities. Here, again, how one frames the
target of Nebraska's law poses a problem. Recall that corporate-farm-
ing restrictions may be understood as prohibiting ownership or pro-
duction by entities, as opposed to individuals. Entity residency is
somewhat more complicated. 125 A corporation is often said to reside
within its state of incorporation.126 Using the entity's state of incorpo-
ration as its residency, it would appear that Nebraska's measure was
entirely neutral-it seems neither likely nor unlikely that the qualify-
ing activities would weed out outsider (foreign) corporations in favor of
insider (domestic) corporations. After all, a qualifying corporation
could be incorporated under Delaware law or Nebraska law. And
many corporations incorporated under Nebraska law may not qualify.
Thus, if a litigant can frame a corporate-farming law as operating on
corporations and can assign insider-outsider status based on the state
of incorporation, the corporate-farming law should not be
discriminatory. 127
124. Granholm, 544 U.S. at 471 ("The mere fact of nonresidence should not foreclose a
producer in one State from access to markets in other States.").
125. See Smith, supra note 7, at 1219-20. Notably, relying upon the location of rele-
vant economic activities within a particular market serves to vest entities with
insider-outsider status in the same way as it does for individuals. Thus, if resi-
dency were not the determinant of outsider status, and the location of a relevant
market activity were, then the problem of figuring out entity residency does not
arise. Of course, this method means there can be no discrimination with regard
to production regulations, and perhaps no discrimination with regard to land-
ownership regulations.
126. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987) (concluding Indi-
ana has an interest in protecting shareholders of corporations incorporated under
Indiana law, referring to such corporations as "in-state corporations" and distin-
guishing them from "nonresident corporations").
127. There are, however, some corporate farming measures that explicitly allow only
entities formed under a state's law to qualify. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
5903(k) (2007) (defining "authorized farm corporation" to include only a "Kansas
corporation"). This raises a somewhat difficult question of discrimination, given
the uncertain nature of how insider-outsider status is determined. For example,
Iowa restricted the ability of some entities to own livestock for extended periods
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Perhaps, however, the DCC analysis need only identify a corpora-
tion's connection to a regulating state, regardless of the state of incor-
poration, before it is deemed a resident. In the absence of such a
connection, the corporation would be deemed an outsider. The critical
step, however, as with individuals, would come in defining that con-
nection. If residency were defined to mean the corporation's principal
place of business,128 it would still be difficult to determine whether
such corporations are more able to satisfy the qualifying activities cri-
teria than those that have their principle places of business elsewhere.
Of course, if one attributes insider-outsider status to the entity based
on the residency of the entity's owners, 129 then matters are compli-
cated by the same choices that must be made in defining individual
residency. 130
before slaughter, but provided an exception for certain cooperatives organized
under Iowa law. That restriction was struck down as facially discriminatory in
Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 241 F. Supp. 2d 978 (S.D. Iowa 2003). The rele-
vant location was the state of organization. The court rejected a non-discrimina-
tion argument premised on the lack of a correlation between the market
participants' physical location and the state law under which the entity was cre-
ated. Id. at 990 ("A cooperative organized under Iowa law is an Iowa entity re-
gardless of where the entity is physically located."). The court gave no reason,
however, for disregarding for discrimination purposes the ability of people physi-
cally located beyond the state's border to utilize the state's cooperative law. For a
critique of Smithfield Foods, see Jennifer M. Vogel, Note, Iowa Code Chapter
9H.2: The State of Iowa's Battle Against Corporate Farming, 30 J. CORP. L. 199
(2004).
Iowa later removed the cooperative exception, which persuaded the Eighth
Circuit to remand the case, directing the lower court to reconsider discrimination
in light of the statutory changes. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. Miller, 367 F.3d 1061
(8th Cir. 2004).
128. See Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers Inc. 447 U.S. 27, 39, 42 (1980) (concluding that a
statute prohibiting out-of-state bank holding companies from owning investment
subsidiaries within the state was "overtly" discriminatory because it made "the
out-of-state location of a bank holding company's principal operations an explicit
barrier to the presence of an investment subsidiary" and because it "discrimi-
nate[d] among affected business entities according to the extent of their contacts
with the local economy").
129. Cf CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 93 (providing that further support for Indiana's inter-
est in its in-state corporations can be found in the act in question's applicability
"only to corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in
Indiana").
130. A substantial question could arise in terms of how many owners of the entity
must bC rcsidents before the entity is deemed an insider or an outsider. That is,
the economic interests of many entities could fall in many states if the residency
of the owners attributes locations to entities. Cf Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 643-46 (1982) (concluding Illinois statute that regulated takeovers of any
company in which 10% of the shares were held by Illinois residents flunked the
Pike test). Perhaps a 10% shareholder requirement is enough to deem an entity
an insider. However, the statute in Edgar did not fall on discrimination grounds.
But the Court was focused on the burdens the law had on out-of-state transac-
tions. Id. at 644.
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All of this is not to say that Nebraska's law did not discriminate
against outsiders. That prospect is explored in the next section. But
it does mean that the notion of insiders and outsiders must be more
fully considered in future cases. A strong argument can be made that
the DCC doctrine views insider-outsider status as a function of the
particular economic activity that the state is regulating. And support
can be drawn from the arbitrariness of residency as a determinant of
insider-outsider status in the case of both individuals and entities.
However, I am content here to proceed without resolving this funda-
mental uncertainty within the DCC doctrine.13 1 A workable discrimi-
nation analysis can proceed on two assumptions that may deserve
more attention in future cases: (1) corporate-farming restrictions oper-
ate to bar individuals from using the corporate form in the markets at
issue and (2) those individuals are vested with insider-outsider status
based on their residency. On these assumptions, discrimination
would occur if Nebraska provided insiders with the ability to use the
corporate form, but barred outsiders from doing so.
2. The Allocation, "The Farm," and Equality
In this context, the extent to which Nebraska's law burdened out-
siders but not insiders turns in the first instance on how one inter-
131. Resolving this quandary depends, in large part, on the constitutional harm that
the DCC doctrine seeks to eliminate. If it is to ensure the existence of a common
market for trade in goods and services, then it is more likely that the location of
the economic activity should be used. If it is the disenfranchisement of outsiders
in the state's political process, which may impede the existence of a common mar-
ket, then residency (correlating with the right to vote) would be more appropri-
ate. Notably, under process-oriented views, finding an insider-outsider status for
entities remains difficult because entities have no vote.
For a few different views on the relevant constitutional harm, see COENEN,
supra note 7, at 209-216 (outlining the various "goals" of the DCC doctrine and
"values" that drive its existence); Adler, supra note 112 (arguing for a principle of
impartiality that requires legislators to "give reasoned consideration to out-of-
state interests"); Bruce F. Broll, The Economic Liberty Rationale in the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 49 S.D. L. REV. 824 (2004); Day, supra note 36, at 51 (gleaning
a concern for economic liberty from the cases under review); Denning, supra note
7 (political unity); Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce
Clause Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L. REV. 377,
453-458, 466-67 (1996) (explaining that discrimination should "focus[] on the
distortion of [economic] decisions" and diffusing the state-autonomy objection by
eliminating the prospect of state competition); Eule, supra note 7 (shortfalls in
the political process); Farber & Hudec, supra note 52, at 1438 ("No matter how a
legal test is articulated, it cannot satisfactorily resolve the tensions between local
autonomy and free trade in all conceivable cases. In the end, the law must have a
certain irreducible messiness in dealing with such fundamental tensions."); Red-
ish & Nugent, supra note 103 (rejecting almost all reasons for the DCC doctrine);
Regan, supra note 7 (the avoidance of legislative protectionist purposes); Sun-
stein, supra note 91, at 1705-1708; Williams, supra note 37 (deliberative
equality).
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prets the phrase "the farm." That phrase imposes a geographic
restraint on where the qualifying activities (farm residency or active
engagement) may occur. Depending on how broadly one interprets
"the farm," the analysis of whether those criteria effectively differenti-
ate between insiders and outsiders changes.
The broad interpretation of "the farm" would have vitiated an ef-
fort to establish discrimination. 13 2 If interpreted at the operational
level, the qualifying activities do not effectively discriminate because
qualifying activities could occur on any parcel of land in the operation.
Thus, any operation in the United States could own land in Nebraska
or engage in farming in Nebraska as a corporation so long as it had
the requisite familial ownership and at least one member of the family
lived on agricultural land properly included in the operation133 or was
actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and management of the oper-
ation. Such activities could occur anywhere. If qualifying activities
could occur anywhere in the United States, then there is no basis upon
which an insider-outsider allocation could be found.
While I disagree with the court's rejection of this interpretation on
textual and practical grounds,134 I am content to proceed with it for
the time being. Under the narrow interpretation of "the farm," Ne-
braska's qualifying activities criteria required anyone who wanted to
use the corporate form to own or operate a Nebraska farm to either
reside on a farm or be actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and
management of a farm. Recall that residency is the only insider-out-
sider attribute that has been identified. Thus, if the corporate-farm-
ing measure's "residing on the farm" qualification or its active-
engagement criteria provided the competitive advantage to Nebraska
residents over non-residents as land buyers or producers, then it was
discriminatory.
a. Farm Residency
It appears obvious that the farm-residency requirement is discrim-
inatory. That is, those who reside on Nebraska farms are able to do
what those who reside outside of the state cannot: use the corporate
132. See Brock H. Cooper, Note, CorporuIa Farming: How inttrnretation of the Com-
merce Clause is Making Restrictions More Difficult, 14 Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
REV. 475, 489 n.108, 497 (2007).
133. One interesting problem that would arise under this interpretation would be
whether or not a corporately owned home in an urban area would qualify as part
of "the farm."
134. See infra, section III.D (questioning this interpretation). Given the size-capping
function of the narrow interpretation, there is also a plausible normative case for
it. See supra text acompanying notes 29-30.
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form to own or operate the Nebraska farm upon which they reside. 135
However, closer examination reveals some flaws in this reasoning.
One way of thinking of Nebraska's law is to envision it as setting
forth requirements that individuals needed to meet before they could
utilize the corporate form to engage in the restricted activities on the
farm at issue. On this view, all non-farm residents, insiders and out-
siders alike, needed to do the same thing-establish residency on the
farm in question. Being a state resident did not matter to one's ability
to buy or operate that farm. This ex-ante view does not reveal
discrimination.
Discrimination, of course, typically raises the specter of inequality.
And one can envision equality as imposing a uniform requirement on
all participants regardless of residency. 13 6 There is nothing in the
DCC doctrine that would prohibit Nebraska from requiring its re-
sidents to establish farm residency before they could qualify to use the
corporate form to own or operate a Nebraska farm. And if equal treat-
ment is all the DCC doctrine requires, then it would appear that Ne-
braska should be able to extend the same treatment to outsiders on
the same terms. Indeed, if the DCC doctrine regards a farm-residency
requirement as discriminatory for purposes of the DCC doctrine, then
Nebraska is forced to shield outsiders from a requirement that it may
constitutionally impose on its own residents. If equality is the under-
lying premise of the DCC doctrine, then it generates a somewhat odd
result here.
However, the result may not be that odd. Sometimes uniformity
generates inequality. For example, minimum price laws requiring
dealers to pay a minimum price for milk can be applied only to the
purchase of milk from in-state producers.13 7 Applying such a law to
dealers who purchase out-of-state milk burdens outsider producers by
eliminating their opportunity to offer their milk at a lower price than
135. The term "residing on" was not defined in Nebraska's law. Thus, it may be that
those who reside on Nebraska farms are not residents of Nebraska for purpose of
the DCC. If this is true, then some outsiders will be able to utilize the residency
requirement, making the proxy somewhat imprecise. However, this is a weak
argument. The explicit use of residency in the corporate farming measure and
residency's role in the DCC doctrine probably cannot be divorced by defining resi-
dency differently for purposes of the corporate farming measure.
136. Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission, 429 U.S. 318, 331 (1977)
("Equal treatment of interstate commerce ... has been the common theme run-
ning through the cases in which this Court has sustained 'compensating,' state
use taxes."); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 577, 586 (1937) (uphold-
ing state use tax on imported goods where "equality and not preference is the end
to be achieved"); see Richard S. Harnsberger, Josephine R. Potuto & Norman W.
Thorson, Interstate Transfers of Water: State Options After Sporhase, 70 NEB. L.
REV. 754, 831 ("There is nothing in Commerce Clause theory that requires a state
to disadvantage its own citizens . . ").
137. Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346 (1939).
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insider producers. 138 In other words, equal treatment for all milk in a
regulating state's market is prohibited by the DCC doctrine. So
maybe, in some instsances, the DCC doctrine requires that outsiders
be shielded from a law that applies to insiders.
Another example of this phenomenon is Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission.139 There, a uniform apple grading
system adopted by North Carolina operated to the disadvantage of
Washington apple sellers who had created their own superior grading
system. There, the application of the North Carolina law had the
"practical effect" of eliminating Washington apple sellers' competitive
advantage, and the law was struck down.l4 0 Again, uniformity was
not allowed under the DCC doctrine.
It would, however, be difficult to argue that Nebraska's law elimi-
nated a competitive advantage to outsiders that it did not also elimi-
nate for insiders on the same terms.14 1 Nebraska's law prohibited the
use of a corporate form by all non-farm residents on all tracts of land
that the state could regulate and allowed that advantage to all farm
residents on the farms upon which they resided. That distinguishes
Nebraska's law from Hunt because in Hunt only the Washington out-
siders were stripped of a competitive advantage. It may also distin-
guish the milk cases.14 2 However, it is not inconceivable that the
DCC doctrine insulates outsiders from some regulation that a state
may constitutionally apply to its own residents.
A more powerful counter to the uniform-treatment argument is to
envision the law not as setting forth requirements for non-farm re-
sidents to meet before they may utilize the corporate form, but rather
to recognize the existence of incumbent landowners and operators who
138. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527-28 (1935).
139. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
140. Id. at 350-52.
141. The specific competitive advantage eliminated in cases like Hunt and Baldwin
may also be fundamentally different than that at issue with corporate-farming
measures. If the ability to use the corporate form is the advantage at issue, it
would seem that laws allowing for the creation of entities are not the same as the
lower prices achieved by producers in the same industry or superior marketing
techniques developed by competing producers. Rather, the use of the corporate
form is a benefit bestowed by state law, not a "competitive and economic advan-
tage[ J" that some outsider group ofcompetitors "has earned for itself." Hunt, 432
U.S. at 351.
142. The milk cases may also be examples of extraterritorial legislation. See Henne-
ford v. Silas Mason Co., Inc., 300 U.S. 577, 585 (distinguishing Baldwin as an
attempt by New York "to project its legislation within the borders of another
state by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired there").
Given that understanding of the milk cases, Nebraska's law was distinguisha-
ble-it did not seek to regulate economic activity occurring beyond its borders.
However, the Court's cases are far from clear on this matter. See generally,
COENEN, supra note 7, at 231-39.
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met the requirements at the time the provision was enacted. 143
Taken as such, there was a group of landowners and operators who
were farm residents at the time of enactment. This group was, by def-
inition, comprised of Nebraska residents and given the ability to util-
ize the corporate form. Perhaps it is this group of some, but not all,
Nebraska residents who were given a competitive advantage. 14 4
There is, however, a problem with this notion of incumbency in re-
lation to the markets at issue and the competitors in those markets
(land buyers and producers). Incumbent land owners were not com-
peting with land buyers for the ability to purchase the farms upon
which they resided-the farms that they could own using the corpo-
rate form. Thus, within the land market, it would not appear that the
restriction had any impact on competition among buyers. Indeed, it
would appear that the restriction's effect on potential buyers burdened
incumbent landowners (insiders) in the market for farmland. Thus,
the question of incumbency is fraught with further difficulty insofar as
farm residency is concerned in the land-buyer market. However, with
regard to competing producers, incumbent farm residents were in
competition with other producers. In this market, perhaps incum-
bency has some traction.
In the end, it is somewhat difficult to establish that the farm resi-
dency requirement did not vest some state residents with an advan-
tage that was withheld from outsiders. However, it is clear that
Nebraska also withheld this advantage from its own residents-those
who were not farm residents, or would not establish farm residency.
Thus, farm residency is, at most, an imperfect proxy for state resi-
dency. 145 Specifically, it is an over-inclusive way of placing outsiders
143. Interestingly, land owned by existing corporations was excluded from the opera-
tion of Nebraska's law on the condition that the entity not expand its landhold-
ings. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1)(D). Thus, if the measure is thought of as
restricting corporations, the set of incumbent landowning corporations was not
comprised merely of farm-resident corporations. However, those corporations
that did establish farm residency were allowed the benefit of further expansion.
144. Notably, the group of incumbent owners and operators would fade over time until
there was no owner or operator who did not have to establish farm residency
before they met the qualification.
145. I use the term "proxy" to simply refer to the general notion that the use of some
characteristics may generate discriminatory effects. See, e.g., Farber & Hudec,
supra note 51, at 1416 (referring to this as the "use of a proxy characteristic").
Thus, it is synonymous with the notion of "practical effect," Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977), and justified by the general no-
tion that discriminatory effects, alone, trigger demanding judicial review. Proxy,
of course, has a different meaning when the existence of discriminatory effects is
treated as a proxy for (or an indicator of) discriminatory purpose. See Hillside
Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 67 (2003) (refusing to answer the question, for
Privileges and Immunities Clause purposes, whether a disparate impact should
be problematic only when it serves as a proxy or whether it should be problematic
simply because of its practical effect).
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at a competitive disadvantage because it burdens all outsiders as well
as some (but not all) insiders. Subsection III.C.3 evaluates whether
this allocation constitutes a discriminatory effect.
b. Active Engagement
With regard to active engagement, matters are somewhat differ-
ent. Recall that Nebraska's active-engagement criteria required that
the qualifying individual be actively engaged in the day-to-day labor
and management of the farm. The farm was interpreted to include
each separate piece of land within the operation, and Nebraska courts
interpreted the requisite activities strictly.
As above, the measure appears to treat insiders and outsiders who
need to establish compliance equally-both would have to become ac-
tively engaged on that farm to engage in the restricted activities using
a corporate form. And one could argue that the DCC doctrine does not
require a state to treat outsiders better than its own residents.
As above, difficulties ensue with those arguments. Uniformity can
sometimes create inequality. And there was a group of incumbent
producers who were given a benefit relative to newcomer producers.
Here, however, active engagement is not as strong of a proxy for state
residency as farm residency was. As with farm residency, there were
many insiders who would not satisfy the criteria. But unlike farm
residency, active engagement could be established by non-residents.
Non-residents in many areas and with many types of production could
perform day-to-day labor and management as easily as many state re-
sidents, so long as they were close enough to the relevant farm.
"Close enough," varied depending on the specific operation at issue
because different farming activities have different labor and manage-
ment needs.146 Some crops-e.g. dry-land wheat-may require little
daily involvement at certain times of the year. 14 7 But some livestock
operations-e.g. a swine farrowing operation-may require contact
multiple times a day. To the extent the particular operation required
less daily activity, it would be easier for a producer to fulfill the "ac-
tively engaged" criteria even though she resided in another state. The
more contact required, the greater the difficulty for insiders and out-
siders to satisfy the criteria. The less contact required, the easier for
insiders and outsiders to satisfy the criteria. In any event, however,
there were outsiders that would qualify and insiders that would not.
Thus, Nebraska's active-engagement criteria was an over-inclusive
and under-inclusive way of burdening non-residents because some re-
146. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
147. In fact, given Nebraska's exemption for custom spraying, fertilizing and harvest-
ing, NEB. CONST. art. XII, section 8(1)(M), perhaps one trip to a dryland wheat
field would have fulfilled the requirements.
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sidents were prohibited from qualifying and some non-residents were
allowed to qualify.
c. A Hypothetical
To summarize matters thus far, consider the following hypotheti-
cal: A farmer residing in Colorado owns a tracts of Colorado farmland.
He is actively engaged in farming on that farm. This farmer wants to
buy a farm in Banner County, Nebraska, and produce dryland wheat
without providing any personal labor. Another farmer resides on a
farm in Sarpy County, Nebraska, and is actively engaged in farming
there. He also wants to buy the Banner County farm for the same
purpose as the Colorado farmer and will provide no personal labor.
Under the broad interpretation of the farm, either would qualify to
own or operate the Banner County farm while using the corporate
form and no discrimination would appear. Their residency or active
engagement with respect to the operation ("the farm") would fulfill
Nebraska's requirements. But if one rejects that interpretation in
favor of a narrower one, does discrimination emerge?
Arguably Nebraska has treated both farmers the same. Each
farmer is assigned insider-outsider status based on his residency.
Both the insider and the outsider need to either establish residency on
"the farm" or become actively engaged on "the farm"-the Banner
County tract. Neither, of course, will. Thus, neither can own nor op-
erate the Banner County farm using the corporate form unless they
fulfill the qualifying criteria. If Nebraska cannot impose its corporate-
farming restriction against the Colorado farmer, then Nebraska would
be forced to treat the Colorado farmer better than the Nebraska
farmer because the Coloradoan is an outsider. Nebraska has, per-
haps, achieved equality.148
But sometimes the DCC doctrine casts equality aside. And incum-
bency is somewhat helpful at establishing differential treatment be-
tween these two farmers. After all, the Nebraska farmer would be
allowed to use the corporate form on his Sarpy County tract because
he resides there and because he is actively engaged there, while the
Colorado farmer cannot use the corporate form on any Nebraska
farms. They are not, however, in competition with one another for the
land already owned by the Sarpy County farmer-the land that the
Sarpy County farmer can use the corporate form to own. In fact, the
Nebraska farmer may be burdened by the restriction because it affects
to whom he may sell his land. The two are, however, competing with
one another as producers, and the Nebraska farmer can use the corpo-
148. See S.D. Farm Bureau, Inc. v. Hazeltine, 202 F.Supp.2d 1020, 1046-47 (D. S.D.
2002) (rejecting facial discrimination on these grounds).
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rate form for his Sarpy County farm, while the newcomer will not be
able to with regard to the Banner County farm.
At the very least, the hypothetical proves that Nebraska's law was
an imperfect proxy for non-residency. With regard to farm residency,
there are no outsiders who qualify (all will be treated like the Colo-
rado farmer), but there are many non-farm-resident insiders (those
like Nebraska farmer and people who do not live on farms) who also do
not qualify. With regard to active engagement, there are both outsid-
ers and insiders who qualify, and there are both outsiders and insiders
who do not (like the Nebraska and Colorado farmaers in this hypo-
thetical). Given this disparate allocation of the relevant burden, the
question becomes one of figuring out what sorts of allocations consti-
tute discriminatory effects.
3. Disparate Allocations and Discriminatory Effects
At this point, it is helpful to return to the notion of discrimination
illustrated at the beginning of this analysis. Both farm residency and
active engagement under the narrow interpretation of the farm in-
volve a burden that has been allocated in a way that deviates from
that depicted in Figure 1. In that figure, perfect discrimination is de-
picted. It could occur explicitly or through the use of a set of provi-
sions that effectively marks outsiders (and only outsiders) for
burdensome treatment relative to their insider competitors. City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey,149 is an example. In that case, New
Jersey divested all out-of-state landfill-service consumers of the ser-
vice offered by New Jersey landfills and imposed no burden on com-
peting in-state landfill-service consumers. 150 Nebraska's law did not
generate this sort of an allocation. It neither used a perfect proxy for
insider-outsider status, nor did it explicitly use insider-outsider status
to allocate its burdens.
Beyond perfect discrimination, there is a certain level of uncer-
tainty concerning what allocations constitute the sort of discrimina-
tion worthy of strict scrutiny. Among commentators, Professor Collins
has argued that the question is whether the law discriminates cate-
gorically amongst insiders and outsiders who are in direct competition
with one another. Under Collins' view, if all benefited parties are
149. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
150. Professor Eule argues that the case overlooked insider landfills that were more
than happy to serve outsiders. Eule, supra note 7, at 463. However, the relevant
participants were the insider and outsider consumers of the waste service. The
claim was, thus, similar to that made (incoherently in this context) by feeding
operations in Jones I. Professor Eule's point is that the outsider consumers had a
reliable surrogate within the state to guard against legislative overreaching.
While this may be true, the Court has not bought into the surrogacy theory under
these circumstances, mainly because of its propensity to apply in all cases. See 1
TRIBE, supra n. 8, 1055-57.
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within the state and all burdened direct competitors are outside, then
the measure is subject to strict scrutiny. And if a measure is only par-
tially discriminatory-i.e., the measure "favors locals in its practical
effect, but also benefits some outsiders" the measure is evaluated
under Pike.151 But, as this section explains, the Court has easily
struck down state laws that do not impose their burden on all outsid-
ers. Indeed, Professor Smith stated simply, "It is not possible to spec-
ify how uneven the distribution of burdens and advantages must be to
count as discrimination."152 And Professor Coenen has stated that
this area remains "under-developed" with strict scrutiny ensuing
when a measure is "distinctively or obviously destructive of interstate
commerce."153 Professor Denning has attempted to sort out some of
the cases, but I do not believe his analysis appreciates the distinction
between the competitive burden at issue in the particular case and the
allocation of that burden among competition.154
151. Collins, supra note 73, at 81 (citing Hunt as an example); Id. at 83-84 (contend-
ing that the difference between categorical discrimination and partial discrimina-
tion is justified in part by the prospect of "long-term market adjustments [that]
reduce cost exporting and improve local political accountability"). Some courts
appear to have gone even further, rejecting the notion that discriminatory effects
trigger strict scrutiny at all, preferring to use Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137 (1970), when discrimination does not appear in the terms of the legisla-
tion, or at least, entertaining Collins view of partial discrimination. See Ill. Rest.
Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 492 F.Supp. 2d 891 (N.D.Ill. 2007) (relying on United
Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330
(2007) (concurring opinion asking first, whether there is any sort of a disparate
impact); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978)); Nat'l
Paint & Coatings Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1124, 1131 (7th Cir. 1995),
followed in Baude v. Heath, 538 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2008) (striking down a portion
of a state law having a discriminatory effect like that depicted in Figure 2.a, in-
fra, under Pike).
152. Smith, supra note 7, at 1219.
153. COENEN, supra note 7, at 239; accord Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 82, at
6-16.
154. Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances
and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. LAW. 907, 925-36 (2005).
While I agree with most of what Professor Denning has written on this subject, I
view his summary as mixing the question of discriminatory allocations with the
relevant burden imposed on competitors. He summarizes the effects cases as
follows:
The clearest cases involve statutes whose effects insulate one locality's
economic actors from competition by out-of-state economic actors. Dis-
criminatory effects can take many forms, including, but not limited to:
(1) using facially neutral criteria merely as a proxy for geographic origin;
(2) effectively barring the import of out-of-state goods, or barring their
sale once imported; (3) acting to raise the cost of doing business in a
state for out-of-state competitors, which costs are not also borne by in-
state actors; (4) stripping competitive advantages from out-of-state com-
petitors; (5) otherwise leveling the playing field to the benefit of in-state
economic actors; or (6) subsidizing in-state actors through mechanisms
that are funded entirely (or largely) by out-of-state economic actors.
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I read the Court's cases as indicating that only certain dispropor-
tionate15 5 allocations qualify as discriminatory. Specifically, if a mea-
sure that burdens some (but not all) insiders along with outsiders, it
Id. at 933 (emphasis omitted) (footnotes omitted).
While I agree that these are "forms" of discrimination, my analysis seeks to
synthesize these examples by distinguishing between the relevant burden and
the allocation of that burden amongst the competitors at issue. That is, each of
these forms involves a relevant burden that was allocated on a discriminatory
basis. The first, proxy use, does not identify a relevant burden, but raises the
difficult question of what sorts of criteria can be thought of as a proxy for "geo-
graphic origin," which I take to mean insider-outsider status. Under my analysis,
such a proxy exists when the criteria employed generate a discriminatory alloca-
tion of the relevant burden. The remaining examples differ in terms of the rele-
vant burden imposed, but assume a discriminatory allocation by stating that the
relevant burden is placed on "in-state" and "out-of-state" participants. My analy-
sis seeks to identify the allocations that qualify as discriminatory.
155. There does not appear to be much controversy concerning whether the notion of
discriminatory effects is one of proportionality when the insiders and outsiders
competing with one another comprise different percentages of the relevant mar-
ket (as they almost surely will). See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 579 n.13 (1997). Thus, it may not matter that Nebraska's
land market generally contains relatively few out-of-state buyers. Data concern-
ing the identity of buyers is contained in a series of reports published by Profes-
sor Bruce B. Johnson at the University of Nebraska, Department of Agricultural
Economics. For instance, in 2007, 10% of buyers were out-of-state. BRUCE JOHN-
SON, BEN BLOMENDAHL & RYAN LUKASSEN, NEBRASKA FARM REAL ESTATE MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS 2007-2008, 14, Table 8 (2008). Notably, out-of-state purchasers
vary by region and over time. See id., Table 7 (reporting 50% out-of-state buyers
in the North region), Table 8 (reporting percentage of out-of-state buyers on
statewide basis since 1998); BRUCE B. JOHNSON, ET. AL, FARM REAL ESTATE OwN-
ERSHIP TRANSFER PATTERNS IN NEBRASKA'S PANHANDLE REGION (2007) (evaluating
ownership patterns from 2003 through the first half of 2006 and finding a high
percentage of acres purchased by out-of-state buyers). Johnson's reports are
available at http://www.agecon.unl.edulrealestate.html.
Johnson's data also show that out-of-state buyers are significant participants
in Nebraska's land market, along with local non-farmers, non-local Nebraska res-
ident non-farmers, and active farmers/ranchers. However, the terms "active
farmer/rancher" and "non-farmers" are not defined. Moreover, the use of entity
business forms is not reported. Thus, it is nearly impossible to draw conclusions
regarding the impact of corporate farming measures. For instance, his data show
that "active farmers/ranchers" comprised a larger percentage of buyers in 2007
(73%) than they did in 2005 (61%). However, it is unclear how Nebraska's corpo-
rate farming measure may have affected these buyers. Perhaps Jones facilitated
"active farmers" purchases by making the corporate form available to "active
farmers" who would not meet 1-300's qualifying criteria. Or, perhaps Jones al-
lowed more out-of-state buyers and non-qualifying local buyers to use the corpo-
rate form than otherwise would have been there and, thus, kept the percentage of
active-farmer purchasers lower than it would have been if 1-300 were in place.
Without a definition of "active farmers" and an analysis that controls for other
market influences that could impact insider and outsider buyers differently,
these data do not show what impact 1-300 had on the identity of buyers
Similarly, while there have been large increases in land values between 2005
and 2007, attributing any portion of the increase to the courts' decisions striking
down Nebraska's law would be speculation at this point. Moreover, even if Ne-
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might be discriminatory. Whether it is or not depends upon the pro-
portion of outsiders who are burdened. If all outsiders are burdened,
the measure is discriminatory. But if only some outsiders are bur-
dened, then the disproportionate impact (if any) does not qualify as
discrimination under the DCC doctrine.
The district court in Jones noted that the Court has struck down
laws that "burdened some in-state interests, or included some out-of-
state interests in their favored classifications."156 While the Court has
struck down laws that do one or the other, it has not been willing to
deem state laws discriminatory when they "burden some in-state in-
terests" and "include[] some out-of-state interests in the favored clas-
sification." Indeed, the Court has upheld such laws.
The matter can best be explained by manipulating the burden rep-
resented within the illustration printed above. In essence, the Court
is only willing to deem a measure discriminatory when the dispropor-
tionate impact is clear.
a. Under-Inclusive Burdens
For example, if a select group of outsiders are burdened by a mea-
sure, the disproportionate impact will be clear, even though the bur-
den was under-inclusively distributed. The following figure depicts








4 --100% 0 100%
braska's measure decreased the value of the land, that in itself is not constitu-
tionally objectionable.
156. Jones I, 405 F. Supp. 2d at 1081.
157. Professor Eule would delineate both the depictions in Figure 1 and 2.a as having
an "outsider impact percentage" of 100%. Eule, supra note 7, at 460. This means
nothing more than the entire cost of the state's regulation is borne by outsiders.
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Hunt is the most illuminating example. There a select group of
outsiders-Washington apple sellers-were disadvantaged in the
North Carolina market for apples by North Carolina's insistence on a
uniform grading system.158  Other outsiders were not
disadvantaged. 159
Northeast Bancorp v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System160 is another example of this sort of distribution. There, Mas-
sachusetts enacted a statute allowing bank holding companies with
their principal places of business in New England states to hold bank-
ing operations within Massachusetts. But for Congressional authori-
zation, this would have been discriminatory. This, again, identifies a
particular under-inclusive group of outsiders for burdensome
treatment.
In Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc.,161 the Court struck
down a Florida law prohibiting bank holding companies with their
principal place of business outside of Florida from owning investment
subsidiaries in Florida. No such restriction was placed on in-state
bank holding companies, nor were any other sort of non-holding-com-
pany participants restricted. While this may have been explicitly dis-
criminatory with regard to holding companies, the measure could also
be thought of as singling out a particular swath of outsider providers
of investment services for burdensome treatment. 16 2
There is, however, one case in which the Court refused to deem a
measure discriminatory even though its burdens appeared to be fo-
cused only on a select group of outsiders. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co.,163 the Court evaluated a law prohibiting the sale of
milk in plastic nonreturnable containers. While there were many
competitive groups of participants affected by this measure (including
dairies packaging their own products and manufacturers of milk con-
tainers), an arguably discriminatory allocation of burdens could have
existed amongst those who sell the raw materials used in milk con-
tainers. Plastic resin suppliers were all outsiders, while pulpwood
suppliers were predominately insiders. The restriction on the use of
plastic resin for non-returnable containers, then, reduced the demand
for a product available only from outsiders that competed with a prod-
158. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
159. Professor Collins describes this as an example of partial discrimination that was
'practically categorical" and "should be invalidated to prevent easy technical
avoidance of the rule against categorical discrimination." Collins, supra note 73,
at 82.
160. 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985).
161. 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
162. See also Best & Co., Inc. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454, 456-57 (1940) (concluding that
all insiders were shielded from a tax, while those outsiders unwilling to locate
retail facilities in the state were not, and that this was discriminatory).
163. 449 U.S. 456 (1981).
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uct available from both insiders and outsiders. The Court refused to
see this as discriminatory and noted that the degree of burden was
exaggerated by the challengers because plastics could still be used for
returnable milk containers and the increase in demand for pulpwood
could be met by outsider suppliers. 164 Assuming, however, that there
would be some disparate treatment that resulted from the measure,
the Court treated the disparity under Pike and concluded that Minne-
sota's law was justified. 165
Clover Leaf Creamery is a difficult case for the narrow-group-of-
outsiders allocation, but it could support two possible qualifications on
the allocation depicted here. First, it could be that there is a de mini-
mus rule embedded in the only-outsiders allocation. That is, perhaps
the Court will not allow a group of burdened outsiders to lay claim to
striking down a state law when the burden imposed upon them is rela-
tively small, unless they can show the law invalid under Pike. This
reading, however, conflicts with cases stating the familiar principle
that such facts go only to the extent of discrimination, not its
existence. 166
The second possible reading makes the most sense: Considering
the allocation in the long run, it was not clear that insider pulpwood
suppliers would capture the benefit created by prohibiting non-return-
able plastic containers. Pulpwood is, after all, a good supplied by
many firms within and outside of Minnesota. Those firms would be
left to compete for the business freed up by the ban on plastic non-
returnables. This reasoning fits with one reading of another impor-
tant effects case, Exxon, considered below.16 7
However one might read Clover Leaf Creamery, it would be of little
help to Nebraska's law because Nebraska's law does not appear to
have created this sort of an allocation in the first place. At least some
insiders cannot use the corporate form under either of the qualifying
activities. In no event is a select group of outsiders exposed to a bur-
den that does not fall upon any insiders.
164. Id. at 472-73.
165. Id.
166. "Varying the strength of the bar against economic protectionism according to the
size and number of in-state and out-of-state firms affected would serve no pur-
pose except the creation of new uncertainties in an already complex field.'" Wyo-
ming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 456 (1992) (quoting New Energy Co. v.
Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 276-77 (1988)). See BITrKER, supra note 7, § 6.06[A], at
6-47 to -48 (describing Wyoming v. Oklahoma). This statement was made in Wyo-
ming in the context of an argument that no discrimination should exist when only
a small portion of in-state goods is favored.
167. See infra, text accompanying notes 190 to 194.
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b. Over-Inclusive Burdens
Another discriminatory allocation arises when a state law burdens
all outsiders along with some insiders. While this allocation troubles
commentators, the Court's treatment seems clear-this is discrimina-
tion. 168 Stated simply, in some cases burdens placed on insiders will






Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,16 9 is a prime example. There, the
Hawaii legislature passed a law exempting only a few Hawaii-pro-
duced beverages from a tax on alcoholic beverages. The Court had no
trouble concluding, "the effect of the exemption is clearly discrimina-
tory, in that it applies only to locally produced beverages, even though
it does not apply to all such products."17o
168. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (striking down
a measure that banned all long trucks but provided exemptions for only Iowa
truck manufacturers and Iowa residents moving mobile homes); cf. Davis v.
Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989) (striking state tax measure
down on discrimination grounds for providing a tax benefit to state and munici-
pal retirees but not federal retirees and non-government retirees); COENEN, supra
note 7, at 200-02 (noting differences of the Court in how to frame the existence of
discrimination in Davis).
169. 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
170. Id. at 271; see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of
Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220-21 & n.10 (1984) (finding a municipal ordinance pre-
ferring residents of the municipality discriminatory for purposes of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, even though many state residents were bur-
dened as well by the preference, and rejecting the dissent's argument that bur-
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Many commentators' consternation has come from process-based
theories of the DCC doctrine. As the proportion of insiders burdened
by the measure increases, the political protection for outsiders in-
creases. Thus, some have argued that judicial intervention is im-
proper when insider interests act as a surrogate for the impact on
outsiders.171 The Court has, at times, been friendly to the process-
based theory. 17 2 But for present purposes, it is sufficient that the
Court has found discrimination in such cases.
Nebraska's farm-residency requirement falls within this alloca-
tion. Farm residency can be taken as barring all outsiders from the
use of the corporate form as well as those insiders who do not reside on
farms. This allocation would qualify as discriminatory. The Jones
courts were therefore right to disregard the inclusion of some bur-
dened insiders where all outsiders were burdened. Thus, they cor-
rectly observed that "an interstate-commerce claim is [not] precluded
by ... the fact that some Nebraska corporations (those that are not
'family farm corporations') may suffer a negative impact under Initia-
tive 300."173 The court framed the State's argument as claiming that
a measure cannot be discriminatory if it "does not exclude solely out-
The participants identified in the analysis, as well as the attribution of in-
sider-outsider status to them, can have an impact on how one detects a discrimi-
natory allocation. For instance, in Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm'n,
429 U.S. 318, 333-35 (1977), the Court deemed discriminatory a New York tax
break for non-residents who made in-state stock sales. The law at issue in Boston
Stock Exchange was much like a local processing requirement. That is, the mea-
sure was discriminatory because of the effect it had on exchanges located within
or beyond the states boundaries. Insider exchanges benefited from the favorable
tax treatment, which was designed to draw business to in-state exchanges. And
no outsider exchanges were given this same benefit because sales on their ex-
changes (and within the state's taxing authority) were not given the tax break.
Thus, the allocation would fall within Figure 1.
If the focus shifts to taxpayers, matters change somewhat. One's initial reac-
tion in considering an allocation among taxpayers is that there was no unconsti-
tutional allocation of benefits. A select group of non-resident taxpayers were
shielded from the tax, but all resident and the remaining non-resident taxpayers
were taxed. Framed as such, the measure favors outsiders. But if insider-out-
sider status is determined by something other than residency, then a discrimina-
tory allocation ensues. Consider, for example, what happens when the location of
the sale is used to attribute insider-outsider status. This would vest non-re-
sidents who were given the tax exemption with insider status. If that were the
case, only a select group of insiders (non-residents making in-state sales-a sub-
class of all people making in-state sales) would be exempt and all outsiders as
well as remaining insiders would be burdened, a Figure 2.b allocation.
171. TRm, supra note 7, at § 6-5, 1053, 1055; Eule, supra note 7, at 468 ("The exis-
tence of a substantial enough impact on represented entities may preclude the
showing of the requisite [outsider impact percentage.]");
172. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473 n. 17 (1981); S.C. State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 189-91 (1938).
173. Jones 1H, 470 F.3d at 1267.
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of-state corporations."174 While the courts relied on Carbone, a better
case to rely on would have been Bacchus Imports. As I explain below,
Carbone's grounding as a local law enacted with a local boundary in
mind makes it a somewhat weak basis for this allocation. But suffi-
cient support exists for the court's discriminatory effects conclusion
with regard to farm residency. It falls within Figure 2.b.
As a matter of process, however, it is difficult to understand why
these allocations ought to be deemed discriminatory and exposed to
strict scrutiny. The history of Nebraska's law is a good example. The
constitutional amendment containing the measure was passed in 1982
by initiative. Before the initiative succeeded a variety of bills had
been considered and rejected by the legislature. 175 The initiative vote
also evinces something less than overwhelming support-290,377 For
and 224,555 Against.1 76 So what was the source of this political resis-
tance? There are three possibilities: (1) non-farm residents within the
state, (2) outsiders waging the political battle within the state;17 7 and
(3) landowners who did not want to see their property decline in value
as a result of the restriction. The most important sector of the resis-
tance is the third. The first involves a group of buyers who may not be
the best surrogates for outsider sellers. 178 The second has never been
recognized by the Court, though perhaps unjustifiably. 179 But the
third squarely provides a viable political check on outsider disen-
franchisement. Landowners do not suffer from the political disorgani-
zation and common presence that plagues the notion of consumer-
based surrogacy. Indeed, it may be that "the most palpable harm im-
posed" 8 0 by this law is the effect it could have on land values. If that
were the case, then "[t]here is no reason to step in and hand local
[andowners and producers] a victory they could not obtain through
the political process."1s' Nonetheless, the Court has been unwilling to
sanction discriminatory allocations among a group of competitors
174. Id.
175. See, e.g., LB 668 (Neb. 1969).
176. 2006-07 NEBRASKA BLUEBOOK 262, available at http://www.unicam.state.ne.us/
about/blue-book.php (last visited April 5, 2009).
177. Interestingly, the campaign against the measure was funded, in part, by outsid-
ers; thus, the political fight actually involved outsiders. Indeed, the campaign
materials relied upon by the Jones courts arose in this context. Ironically, those
materials supported the courts' discriminatory-purpose rationale. But, at the
same time, they seem to fulfill the process-based concerns underlying the DCC
doctrine.
178. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 1055; Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 125, 132-33.
179. Lisa Heinzerling, The Commercial Constitution, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 217, 253-55
(1995).
180. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 345 (2007).
181. Id.
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based on the quantum of insiders harmed by a measure that burdens
all outsiders.
Even though farm residency may fall by this sword, active engage-
ment does not. As explained above, the active-engagement criteria
were both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. That takes the alloca-
tion out of Figure 2.b.
c. Non-discriminatory Disparities
Above, the allocation of burdens was clearly discriminatory, and I
have discussed how Nebraska's farm-residency criteria may fall
within Figure 2.b. However, the Court's cases finding no discrimina-
tory effects provide a sound basis for arguing that Nebraska's active-
engagement requirement was not discriminatory.
When a measure burdens some, but not all, outsiders and insiders,
matters become more complex. For example, equal allocations of the






If the burden falls more heavily on insiders, then no discrimination
has occurred:
182. Professor Eule would refer to this as having an "outsider impact percentage" of
50% because the burden is cast "equally upon those within and without the
state." Eule, supra note 7, at 460-61.
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But if the burden falls more heavily
then a disproportionate impact emerges:







The Court, however, has been somewhat unwilling to deem this
allocation discriminatory. Some commentators have argued that it
should, based primarily on the process-based implications of laws hav-
ing this effect.1s 3 That is, in these cases, outsiders were not ade-
183. See Eule, supra note 7, at 472-75 (arguing for a sliding scale of review based on




quately protected by the political processes in the regulating state. It
may be that process is not the underlying concern of the DCC doctrine.
But a more plausible explanation for the Court's refusal to find this
allocation discriminatory is that it is generally too difficult in most
cases to make the sort of proportionality determination that would
place a measure's effects within Figure 3.c, as opposed to Figures 3.a
and 3.b. This is especially so when a court's analysis is confined to the
practical effect of the legislation, drawn primarily from the legislative
text. Given these difficulties, this sort of disparate impact is generally
left for analysis under Pike, with one narrow exception.
An example helps illustrate how the burden's allocation can be-
come difficult when we move beyond the allocations depicted in
Figures 1 and 2 to the allocations found in Figure 3. To simplify quite
dramatically, assume there are 150 total competitors in a market, 100
of whom are insiders and 50 of whom are outsiders. If a law bars 50
insiders and 27 outsiders from the market based on some characteris-
tic common to those 77 participants, but allows in the remaining 73
insiders and outsiders, then one could argue it is discriminatory in its
effect, falling within Figure 3.c. That is 50% of the insiders are





100% 50% 0 54% 100%
Thus, the measure burdens outsiders more than insiders. On bal-
ance, then, the ex-post market structure is roughly 68% insider and
32% outsider. Before the measure, about 67% were insiders and 33%
were outsiders. Thus, the law had the effect of enhancing the insider
20, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("a measure has a dis-
criminatory distribution of benefits and burdens when a substantial majority of
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position in the market, disproportionately impacting outsiders. But
such proportionality inquiries are not the stuff of discriminatory ef-
fects under the DCC doctrine, at least not of the sort that triggers
strict scrutiny.
The allocations covered in Figure 2 make the disproportionality
clear. Working with the market-access example, if the measure allows
some but not all insiders and bars all outsiders, the effect is to dis-
criminate against outsiders. Thus, 100% of the outsiders are barred,
and less than 100% of the insiders are barred. This allocation is found
in Figure 2.b above. And if only a select group of outsiders are
barred-Figure 2.a-then the disproportionate impact remains clear
for similar reasons.
With Nebraska's law, there was simply no evidence to substantiate
a Figure 3.c allocation. It is impossible to answer in the abstract
whether Nebraska's active-engagement criteria disproportionately
burdened non-residents. There may have been a large proportion of
insiders who were burdened, while only a small proportion of outsid-
ers were burdened. Of course, the opposite could have been true too.
Much would depend on how the relevant insiders and outsiders are
selected. If they were only those participants that would, absent the
restriction, participate in the market, then the proportions may be dif-
ferent than if the participants included all of those who could, absent
the restriction, participate. And the type of agricultural land and pro-
duction would be relevant as well.1s4 Absent data supporting the
claim, a conclusion on disproportionality is fraught with difficulty in
this context.1 8 5
184. See supra, text accompanying notes 143-44.
185. Moreover, even with data supporting a claim of disproportionality, at least four
Justices have indicated that this sort of relative burden is more suited for Pike.
See United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 397 U.S.137, 142
(1970)) (alteration in original) (equating the absence of a "disparate impact on
out-of-state as opposed to in-state businesses" with the absence of an "incidental
burden" under Pike, but concluding that "any arguable burden does not exceed
the public benefits of the ordinances").
From a process perspective, invoking something other than strict scrutiny in
these sorts of circumstances makes sense. As with farm residency, the presence
of a reliable surrogate suggests the political process was adequate. In addition,
the insiders burdened by this measure were armed with the fact that a group of
outsiders were not. That fact, in turn, provides further assurances that the polit-
ical process adequately took account of the measure's burdens. Indeed, the DCC
doctrine's tolerance for laws that predominately benefit outsiders supports this
rationale. Stated in process terms (and artfully working in a concern for free
trade), this tolerance can be explained by the presence of a reliable political check
on a government skewing trade in favor of outsiders.
This point also provides the beginnings of an answer to the problem of state
subterfuge. The possibility that a state may too easily avoid a decision rule and
cause constitutional harm is one reason not to adopt it. For example, one may
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Even with such data, however, the Court has been unwilling to
deem Figure 3.c allocations discriminatory. The primary case sup-
porting the notion that Figure 3.c does not qualify as a discriminatory
effect is one of the more difficult cases to understand on the DCC
shelf: Exxon.186 In Exxon, the Court was faced with a Maryland stat-
ute that prohibited petroleum refiners and producers from owning re-
tail gasoline stations. A discriminatory effect would seem to emerge
from the facts because there were no insider producers or refiners of
gasoline in Maryland. However, the Court rejected that argument.
The Court looked to the retail market and found both insider and out-
sider owners of such stations. The burden imposed on producers and
refiners hit primarily outsiders-95% of the excluded firms were out-
siders that operated 98% of the stations affected.187 Those who were
not affected were both insiders and outsiders. To the Court, the mea-
sure was not discriminatory. From a disproportionate-impact stand-
point, the case is troubling. But it illustrates the Court's refusal to
find discrimination based upon disproportionate impacts.1 88
Clover Leaf Creamery is another case that could involve a Figure
3.c allocation. The facts are discussed above, and the case seems to
suggest that there are exceptions to Figure 2.a allocations.189 The
Court was not entirely clear, however, on whether the burdened
plastic resin producers were all outsiders. At one point, the Court
states that "the raw material used for making plastic nonreturnable
milk jugs, is produced entirely by non-Minnesota firms," but at an-
other point states that the burdened group was "a predominately out-
of-state industry."190 If the latter is true, then Clover Leaf Creamery
is like Exxon in its allocation and supports Figure 3.c. Again, discrim-
ination did not ensue from the disproportionate impact.
prefer a decision rule that regards discriminatory allocations as only those that
fall within Figures 1 and 2.a. But the possibility that states would be willing to
move the allocation into Figure 2.b only to avoid a discrimination conclusion jus-
tifies treating Figure 2.b allocations as discriminatory, even if such laws in some
instances cause no constitutional harm. Figure 3 allocations, however, do not
present the same danger of subterfuge because in order to move the allocation to
one that predominately favors insiders, the state will need to provide the benefit
to outsiders and burden insiders. Perhaps a state is willing to do one or the other
to avoid strict scrutiny, but it may not be willing to do both given the political
costs involved. Of course, if the legislation does this explicitly, strict scrutiny
probably should ensue. But if the legislation does this only effectively, then Pike
would be more appropriate.
186. BIrKER, supra note 7, § 6.06[A], at 6-43.
187. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
188. In fact, the presence of insiders in Exxon is not altogether clear. The Court was
quite focused on the lack of any impact on the movement of goods and it stated at
one point in the opinion that, "there are no local producers or refiners." Id. at
125-26 (majority opinion).
189. See supra text accompanying note 160-64.
190. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 473-74 (1981).
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In fact, the only modern case in which the Court has been willing
to find a disproportionate impact discriminatory in effect is Camps
Newfound/Owattona, Inc. v. Town of Harrison ("Camps").19 1 In that
case the Court evaluated a Maine statute that provided a lower real-
estate tax liability for non-profit entities serving primarily Maine re-
sidents. This, in turn, resulted in higher tuition rates for those con-
sumers who patronized the non-qualifying camps. Because, by
definition, such camps would predominately serve outsiders, the "bur-
den of Maine's facially discriminatory tax scheme falls by design in a
predictably disproportionate way on out-of-staters, [thus] the perni-
cious effect on interstate commerce is the same as in our cases involv-
ing taxes targeting out-of-staters alone."192
Predictability of this sort-what I call clear disproportionality-is
lacking in many cases. Among consumers of camp services in Camps,
Maine's tax system disproportionaly impacted outsiders precisely be-
cause the tax benefit was explicitly given only to those camps serving
a predominately insider clientele, while it was withheld from those
camps serving a primarily outsider clientele. Nebraska's law is
clearly distinguishable. There was no textual means of detecting a
disproportionate allocation. And if data had been produced showing
such a disparity, Exxon and Clover Leaf Creamery suggest that Figure
3.c, even if established, does not qualify as discriminatory.
d. Post-Enactment Market Adjustments or "Structural"
Regulation
Exxon and Clover Leaf Creamery contain a further principle that is
consistent with the notion of predictability and clear disproportional-
ity, but which runs contrary to the notion that a substantiated Figure
3.c allocation is non-discriminatory. One key factor that weighed into
the Exxon Court's analysis was the lack of any showing that outsiders
would not take the place of the outsiders that the statute affected.19 3
As the Court stated in Exxon: "[I]nterstate commerce is not subjected
to an impermissible burden simply because an otherwise valid regula-
tion causes some business to shift from one interstate [participant] to
another." 194 And the Court used the same logic in Clover Leaf Cream-
ery.195 This suggests that the Court concluded no problematic dispar-
191. 520 U.S. 564 (1997).
192. Id. at 579-80. The Court's invocation of "design" also suggests that this case is
more about discriminatory purpose than discriminatory effects. If that is the
case, then it need not be synthesized with the cases dealing with discriminatory
effects. It could also be an example of combining the types of discrimination uti-
lized to trigger strict scrutiny. See supra, text accompanying note 49.
193. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 127.
194. Id.
195. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 1056; see also, supra text accompanying note 164 (explain-
ing the longitudinal aspect of Clover Leaf); see Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M.
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ity existed (despite the existence of a disproportionate impact at the
time of enactment) because outsiders might replace the particular out-
sider participants pushed out of the market. Indeed, that concern
may be what made Exxon a case concerning a state law that regulated
"'the particular structure or methods of operation' of a market."19 6 In
terms of Figure 3.c, this reasoning pushes the right boundary of the
burden toward the center, indicating that the burden may be depicted
by Figures 3.a or 3.b, over the long run.19 7
Nebraska's law cannot be shielded by Exxon's concern for post-en-
actment market adjustments, even though it has some surface appeal.
If one envisions Nebraska's measure as barring corporations from ac-
cess to the markets at issue, then barring non-qualifying outsider (and
insider) entities still leaves the market open for any individual or
qualifying corporation to participate. Such individuals may be outsid-
ers, and (depending upon how corporate outsider status is deter-
mined) so may the qualifying corporations. Taken in that light,
Nebraska's active-engagement criteria (as well as its farm-residency
requirement), did not predictably keep outsiders from the relevant
market. Rather, the law identified entities that were ill-suited to Ne-
braska's view of the production agriculture, much like producers and
refiners of oil in Exxon. More of those entities may be outsiders than
insiders, but there was no assurance that outsiders would not acquire
the land and production that was freed up by keeping the prohibited
entities out of the markets.
One prominent example of an outsider gaining access after Ne-
braska's law was in place is Nebraska's largest landowner-Ted Tur-
ner. 198 Mr. Turner acquired his interests after Nebraska's law was in
place and was unable to satisfy its restrictions. As in Exxon and Clo-
ver Leaf Creamery, and unlike Camps Newfound/ Owattona, one could
argue that there is no reason to think that outsider individuals like
Mr. Turner will not gain access at the same level that they did before
the regulation was put in place.
This sort of analysis, however, ignores the idea that the relevant
burden was the inability to use the corporate farm, not market ac-
Lary, Retail Store Size-Capping Ordinances and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 37 URB. LAw. 907, 935 (2005) (adopting, in part, this reading of Exxon
Corp., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) and Clover Leaf).
196. United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 346 (2007) (quoting Exxon Corp., 437 U.S. at 474).
197. There would, of course, be other challenges available to strike down such regula-
tion, such as due process and equal protection.
198. See Paul Hammel, Turner "Almost Done" Buying Up Ranchland, OMAHA WORLD
HERALD, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.omaha.com/index.php?u-page=2798&u-sid=
10252506 (last visited April 5, 2009); LandReport.com, America's 100 Largest
Landowners, http://www.landreport.com/americas-100-largest-landowners/ (last
visited April 5, 2009).
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cess. 199 Mr. Turner, for example, was burdened by Nebraska's mea-
sure, even though he was still able to gain access to the relevant
markets. Thus, the presence of outsider individuals who would pro-
ceed without the corporate form should not affect the analysis, lest we
forget the burden at issue.
In fact, if the burden in Exxon is framed slightly differently, the
distinction between the restriction at issue there and corporate farm-
ing laws becomes clearer. In Exxon, the prohibition on producers and
refiners could be reframed as burdening retail owners from the eco-
nomic benefits of vertical integration-owning production and refin-
ing capacity. Taken in that light, the burden was placed on all retail
owners regardless of their insider-outsider status. And there was no
reason to think that this burden would continue to be felt in the long
run by more outsiders than insiders who sought to engage in the retail
gasoline business. 20 0 With corporate-farming restrictions, the burden
(denial of the use of the corporate form) is continually withheld from
those individuals who do not perform the qualifying activities. As
shown above, that may or may not constitute discrimination. But it
surely means Nebraska's law could not take advantage of the longitu-
dinal aspects of Exxon and Clover Leaf Creamery.
Time aside, however, Nebraska's active-engagement requirement
continues to fall within the general notion that Figure 3 allocations
are not discriminatory, absent a textual grounding for predictable dis-
proportionate impact or (perhaps) data establishing a Figure 3.c allo-
cation. Moreover, unlike in Exxon and Clover Leaf Creamery, there
was no initial showing that the restriction disproportionately im-
pacted outsiders relative to insiders. Thus, the market-adjustment
principle is unnecessary.
199. A similar sort of logic impugns the argument that these laws should not be struck
down because they are not really effective at keeping anyone out of the market.
Thus, it should not be relevant that "in practical effect, the laws do not exclude
outside investment in land, but rather make only one legal format for such in-
vestment illegal. Nor do they exclude agribusinesses from influence on farm op-
eration, but only require such businesses to use more complex legal
arrangements to achieve their objectives." Morrison, supra note 16, at 992.
Rather, "the elimination of one legal format for such investment" and the require-
ment that some "use more complex legal arrangements" are themselves competi-
tive disadvantages. Thus, even if these laws do not achieve their goals, as
Morrison posits, that is unlikely to mean there is no discrimination.
200. This observation may also give so-called anti-big box ordinances vitality. That is,
in the long run, there is little reason to think that a restriction on retail-store size
will keep more outsiders from the market than insiders. See Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1011-12, 1014 (E.D.Cal. 2006) (read-
ing Exxon in this manner).
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e. Localism and Insider Burdens
For Nebraska's active-engagement requirement to fall within Fig-
ure 3 (which depicts non-discriminatory scenarios) and not Figure 2.a
(which depicts a discriminatory scenario), it must burden insiders.
There is a line of local processing cases that suggests the burden Ne-
braska's law imposed on some insiders was insignificant, but these
cases are ultimately unconvincing.
Of particular relevance here are local restrictions imposed at the
state level.201 Take, for example, a state law that uses local lines but,
when considered en toto, covers the entire area of the state. The Court
has found here that the effect on outsiders is exactly the same as if the
state had used its political boundary: all outsiders are burdened, while
no insiders are burdened. 202 For example, in Fort Gratoit, the state
prohibited the importation of waste into a county from beyond each
county's borders. Thus, waste producers within each county benefit-
ted from exclusive access to the county site, while all other insiders
and outsiders were burdened. This would appear to put the measure
within Figure 2.b. However, an alternative reading suggests that the
out-of-county insiders are not really burdened under these circum-
stances because each insider who is denied access in another county is
given exclusive access to the waste facility within their county. That
is, a local benefit offsets any burden imposed on the insider produc-
ers. 20 3 Outsider waste producers experience no such offsetting bene-
fit. Thus, such cases can be said to fall within Figure 1:
201. Localist laws imposed by local governments raise interesting questions about
whether non-local, in-state participants are insiders or outsiders for purposes of
the DCC inquiry. Process-based approaches to the DCC may do well to argue
that that they are not. However, the matter is unclear. C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994); cf United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984) (Privileges and Im-
munities case in which the process-based theory is not as strong); TRIBE, supra
note 7, at 1264 n.71 (questioning the Camden Court's "cavalier rejection of an
analogy to the surrogate representation analysis so central to Commerce Clause
jurisprudence"). In any event, locally imposed local restrictions are not relevant
for present purposes because Nebraska's law was enacted at the state level.
Thus, local political boundaries do not impact the analysis or the question of clas-
sifying insiders and outsiders.
202. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353,
361 (1992).
203. Professor Williams helpfully presented some doctrinal rules for dealing with the
problem of localism. His categorization goes much farther than required here,
but his category of state imposed localist requirements provides the offsetting-
benefit rationale. Williams, supra note 180, at 67.
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This cancelling effect also helps implement the familiar principle
that a state cannot be allowed to close its borders through its political
subdivisions.204
Even without the cancelling effect, Fort Gratoit qualified as dis-
criminatory under cases like Bacchus Imports.2o5 However, the basic
idea of cancelling some insider benefits could make Nebraska's active-
engagement requirement discriminatory by taking the allocation out
of Figure 3 and placing it within Figure 2.a (where only a select group
of outsiders are burdened). This occurred, for example, in one of the
cases relied upon in Fort Gratoit-Brimmer v. Rebman.20 6 There,
state law required that all meat slaughtered more than 100 miles
from its place of sale must be inspected before it could be sold. With
regard to those within the regulated state, some insiders were bur-
dened by inspection when trying to sell in markets beyond 100 miles
of their slaughtering locations. Similarly, some outsiders were bur-
204. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), is an example of the
same sort of cancelling effect. There, a facially neutral dairy tax was used to fund
subsidies to in-state dairies. The subsidy to insiders cancelled out the entirety of
the tax burden imposed on insiders and, thus, the only group burdened consisted
of outsiders. For a discussion of the linkage necessary to offset a tax burden in
this context see, Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect Linkage: The In-
terplay of State Taxing and Spending Measures in the Application of Constitu-
tional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2167 (1997); Brannon P.
Denning, The Maine Rx Prescription Drug Plan and the Dormant Commerce
Clause Doctrine: The Case of the Missing Link[age], 29 Am. J.L. & MED. 7 (2003).
205. From a process standpoint, however, it explains why some burdens felt by insid-
ers should not qualify as surrogates for outsider interests.
206. 138 U.S. 78 (1891). Brimmer was decided, of course, long before the Court's cur-
rent doctrine. However, the Court uses the language of discrimination and the
case has been cited and quoted in more modern cases like Fort Gratiot. So it
would be difficult to argue that Brimmer was a non-discrimination case.
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dened by inspection when trying to sell in markets beyond 100 miles
of their slaughtering location. But there were both insiders and out-
siders within 100 miles of various places of sale within the state who
were not burdened. Thus, the measure would seem to fall within Fig-
ure 3. However, each insider suffering a burden could rest assured
that he had a competitive advantage within 100 miles of his slaugh-
tering location. The same did not hold for outsiders beyond 100 miles
of the state's border. In the end, then, no meat seller within the State
was burdened and all outsiders beyond 100 miles of the state were
burdened. This set of facts does not fall within Figure 3, but rather




Nebraska's active-engagement requirement poses a difficult prob-
lem of localism. State measures that impose local preferences can be
seen as posing a burden only on outsiders even though insiders are
nominally restricted. Unlike Fort Gratoit, Nebraska's active-engage-
ment criteria cannot be taken as indirect state action through political
subdivisions that basically closes trade at the state's border. How-
ever, as in Fort Gratoit and Brimmer v. Rebman, there may be a can-
celling effect that tends to diminish the burden placed on insiders.
Reconsider the hypothetical above. It would appear that the Colo-
rado farmer and the Nebraska farmer experience the same burden
with regard to the Banner County tract of land. However, the Ne-
braska farmer has better access than the Colorado farmer to land lo-
cated closer to his operation because the Nebraska farmer can more
easily perform the qualifying activities closer to home. So the burden
on the Nebraska farmer (the insider) may be cancelled by the local
benefit he is given with regard to land located closer to his operation.
If that is the case, then the burden on insiders like the Nebraska
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farmer falls out of the picture, and outsiders like the Colorado farmer
are the only ones suffering a real burden with regard to owning and
operating Nebraska farms. That could put active engagement within
Figure 2.a.
There are two ways of distinguishing the Fort Gratoit and Brim-
mer lines of cases. First, in many of these cases, the discrimination at
issue is in favor of local businesses providing some service that could
be provided elsewhere. 20 7 That sort of discrimination is not at issue
with corporate-farming restrictions. One economic activity at issue is
production. That production will take place within the state with or
without the measure. Thus, it does not draw commerce to the state by
imposing some requirement that outsiders use local service providers.
Rather it requires only that local commercial activities be performed
by qualifying individuals. Those activities, however, will be per-
formed locally in any event. Thus, the local-processing cases appear
distinguishable.
However, this argument is weak. Recall that the relevant activity
is not just production. The purchase of land is also at issue. Insiders
like the Nebraska farmer can rest assured that they will qualify to
buy land somewhere close enough to them without having to compete
with the Colorado farmer on the same terms. Thus, even though a pos-
sible distinction may arise between corporate-farming laws and the
local-processing cases, the general notion of local favoritism at the
state level counsels in favor of viewing the effects as falling within
Figure 2.a.
The strongest argument for distinguishing the Fort Gratoit and
Brimmer line of cases emerges from a closer look at the insiders who
are burdened by these measures. Thus far, the discussion has focused
on individuals, but it has remained somewhat narrow, with individu-
als like the Colorado farmer and the Nebraska farmer in mind. But
the boxes depicted above contain everyone who would or could seek to
own or operate Nebraska farms. While participants like the Nebraska
farmer get a local benefit that offsets the burden otherwise imposed
upon them, there are many other insiders in the market for farmland
who will not become actively engaged, regardless of how close the land
is to them and will not be able to utilize the corporate form. 20 8 In
Brimmer and Fort Gratoit2o9 there was simply no way of looking at
the relevant participants in a manner other than meat sellers and
207. See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948);
Johnson v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 16 (1928); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel,
278 U.S. 1 (1928).
208. Framed in terms of barring entity access to these markets, many insider entities
will not be able to satisfy the qualifying criteria.
209. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890) (striking down as discriminatory a
state law requiring cattle to be inspected on the hoof in Minnesota before the
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
waste producers. The product or service at issue restricted the rele-
vant class to those participants. However, with land, the relevant par-
ticipants are not simply participants like the Colorado and Nebraska
farmers. They include other insiders who would own Nebraska farms
but would never fulfill the active-engagement requirement. And those
participants continue to be burdened. This keeps the allocation within
Figure 3, despite the presence of some nominally burdened insiders






f The Relevance of Costs
Thus far, the effect of Nebraska's law has been framed as burden-
ing some participants' access to the relevant markets. A more exact-
ing evaluation of Nebraska's law could, however, regard the burden of
restricting participants' use of the corporate form as increasing the
costs of doing business for some competitors. At times, the Court has
indicated that laws increasing the participant's costs of doing business
are problematic under the DCC doctrine. 2 10 If discriminatory effects
are based on the costs imposed on insiders and outsiders, rather than
the proportion of insiders or outsiders affected, matters become a bit
murkier.
Suppose, for example, outsider competitors have a 60% market
share in some market. Each outsider experiences different costs in
that market attributed to the regulation, but the total costs add up to
$2200. Suppose also that insiders have the remaining 40% market
meat could be offered for sale), should also be included in this line of cases, given
its appearance in Fort Gratoit.
210. See Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 333, 350-51
(1977).
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share. Only a portion of them experience regulatory costs that add up
to $1800. In terms of participants, the burden is discriminatory be-
cause it is placed on all outsiders, but only some insiders-Figure 2.b.
The burden's financial impact would also appear to be felt more heav-
ily by outsiders ($2200) than insiders ($1800). However, insiders are
disproportionately burdened.
A proportionate impact would allocate the $4000 in total costs
amongst the insiders and outsiders according to their share of the
market. Thus, insiders and outsiders should shoulder $40 per per-
centage point of their share in the market. ($1600 for insiders, and
$2400 for outsiders). On these facts, however, insiders are burdened
relative to outsiders. Insiders shoulder $1800 worth of the costs or
$45 per percentage point of their market share, while outsiders shoul-
der $2,000 worth of the costs or $36.67 per percentage point. Thus,
upon closer examination, it would appear that increases in the cost of
doing business may not be constitutionally problematic even when a
look at participation numbers would reveal a problematic disparity.
In this hypothetical, the allocation initially falls within Figure 2.b.
The circumstances under which this cost theory would make a seem-
ingly predictable or clear set of discriminatory effects non-discrimina-
tory are limited to this allocation. 211 If all outsiders are burdened,
and no insiders are, then discrimination follows (Figure 1). The cost
approach does nothing to change this because there are no costs
placed upon insiders that could be at issue. Similarly, if a select group
of outsiders are burdened, then discrimination follows (Figure 2.a).
The cost approach does nothing to change this, again, because there
are no costs placed upon insiders that could be at issue. 2 12 Similarly,
a cost approach does not undermine the case for treating Figure 3 as
non-discriminatory. If some insider participants (but not all) are bur-
dened and some outsider participants (but not all) are burdened, then
looking to the costs imposed may or may not reveal a problematic dis-
parity, but data on costs would be necessary. Indeed, the cost ap-
proach bolsters the case for refraining from discriminatory effects
conclusions within Figure 3.
211. There are, however, arguments for engaging in a more thorough cost-benefit
analysis that would effectively eliminate most of the rules I've gleaned above.
Professor Heinzerling has argued that benefits should be taken into account if
the goal of the DCC doctrine is to eliminate discriminatory laws because of their
inefficiency. Heinzerling, supra note 176, at 220. For instance, a cost-benefit
analysis may reveal that the costs placed on outsiders are outweighed by the ben-
efits they receive or the benefits accruing to others affected by the regulation.
The Court has not, as of yet, been willing to engage in a thorough cost-benefit
analysis in discrimination cases. Though, as I explain above, insider benefits are
sometimes used to offset a putatively insider burden.
212. These inquiries would also transcend the confines of a facial attack.
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So the pitfall is only with circumstances depicted in Figure 2.b. It
arises where all outsiders are burdened along with some insiders, but
a look at the costs imposed reveals that insiders are shouldering as
much or more of the relevant burden than outsiders, proportionately
speaking. This may mean that facial discriminatory-effects chal-
lenges should not be available in cases where some insiders are bur-
dened along with all outsiders, at least when the claimed burden is an
increase in the costs of doing business.2 13 In such cases, the question
of discriminatory effect deserves more attention. This problem could
also be alleviated in the doctrine by allowing the regulating state the
ability to rebut a presumption of discrimination with data showing the
relative burden on insiders is, in fact, greater than or equal to the
burden placed on outsiders.
As applied to corporate-farming measures, the cost approach to
burdens could lend itself to an argument that farm residency is not
discriminatory despite its Figure 2.b allocation. 214 That is, if the ob-
jection to disallowing the use of the corporate form to non-farm re-
sidents is that it increases the costs of doing business for those firms
that cannot qualify, then one would have to evaluate what this costs
non-qualifying insiders and outsiders. Such a cost allocation may re-
veal that insiders are burdened more than outsiders. This could, in
turn, mean that there is no discriminatory effect. In order to figure
this out, one would need to look at the relevant markets and calculate
what proportion of buyers are insiders and outsiders. 2 15 Then the
costs imposed by prohibiting the use of the corporate form would need
to be determined. That, at the least, would take the analysis far past
the law's text. Alternatively, the state could be given the opportunity
213. The question of increased costs is also slippery because all state regulations have
an impact on outsiders operating within a particular market. However, the point
here is to isolate disparate increases in competitors costs caused by regulation
and not attributable to other sources-e.g., distance and, perhaps, other states
laws. See Earl M. Maltz, How Much Regulation Is Too Much-An Examination
of Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 47, 81-85 (1981-82)
(arguing that burdens dependent upon conflicts between the regulating state's
law and the law of other states should not be burdens that the DCC doctrine
recognizes). Distance is, of course, relevant to the costs of doing business in this
sector, at least for producers using the land in their farming operations.
214. Active engagement, as explained above, does not fall within Figure 2.b. If any-
thing, it falls within Figure 2.a or Figure 3, without addressing costs. Notably,
however, if costs are the appropriate method of evaluating a restriction on the
corporate form, the case for placing active engagement's burdens in Figure 3 may
be different because the offsetting benefits of local access would be calculated
differently.
215. While this step would appear necessary with regard to participant approaches to
discriminatory effects, such an appearance is inaccurate. So long as the distribu-
tion falls within Figures 1 or 2, and costs are not considered, then the actual
proportions are not relevant because the resulting allocation will be dispropor-
tionate so long as there are outsiders and insiders in the relevant market.
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to rebut a participant-derived discrimination conclusion with actual
evidence of the costs imposed. However, the Court has not yet enunci-
ated a state's ability to do so. 2 16
In sum, 2 1 7 Nebraska's farm-residency requirement produced a dis-
criminatory effect with regard to access to the corporate form, assum-
ing that the actual costs associated with such a restriction were
irrelevant to the determination. The burdened class consisted of all
non-residents and some (but not all) residents. That constitutes dis-
crimination and triggers strict scrutiny. Those who could satisfy the
active-engagement criteria were not, however, a select group of insid-
ers. There were some insiders and some outsiders who did not meet
the requirements. And the local benefits bestowed on some of the pu-
tatively burdened insiders did not offset the entire insider burden.
The prospect of disproportionately burdening outsiders relative to in-
siders was a possibility, but that effect did not clearly emerge from the
face of the legislation. It would appear, then, that Pike was the more
appropriate standard for judging whether Nebraska's active engage-
ment criteria passed muster or, at least, more data was required. In
any event, despite the somewhat structural nature of this sort of regu-
lation, the longitudinal look at market structure employed in cases
like Exxon does not help establish Nebraska's law as non-
discriminatory.
D. A Clear Error: The Livestock-Feeding Market
The land and production markets are somewhat complicated in
terms of discriminatory effects. However, there is one additional mar-
216. One reason may be the formal distinction between "facial discrimination" and
"discriminatory effects" and the sufficiency of each, on its own, to trigger strict
scrutiny. A more precise distinction between explicit discrimination and discrim-
inatory effects, with the latter claim arising in both facial and as-applied chal-
lenges, may lend itself to introducing this opportunity to the doctrine.
The Court, however, appears to be fairly hostile to using the actual effects of a
measure to nullify an initial discrimination conclusion. For instance, in Oregon
Waste Systems, Inc. v. Dep't of Env't Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994), the Court evalu-
ated a state law that imposed a higher surcharge on outsider waste than insider
waste when hauled to private disposal facilities within the state. The state ar-
gued that the facially discriminatory treatment was really not discriminatory at
all because its additional surcharge was tied directly to the uncompensated costs
to the government of disposing of non-residents' (i.e., non-taxpayers') waste. The
Court rejected the argument.
217. The conclusions drawn here, of course, rest upon the assumptions and conclu-
sions drawn above that necessitated an analysis of the allocation; specifically,
that Nebraska's corporate-farming measure burdened individual land buyers and
producers by restricting their use of the corporate farm, and those participants'
insider-outsider statue has determined by their state residency.
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ket within which Nebraska's law operated. The market for livestock
feeding services was clearly put at issue by one of the plaintiffs in
Jones-a feedlot. That feedlot performed a service for livestock own-
ers-fattening cattle for sale. It claimed that Nebraska's law im-
pacted its ability to offer its services to customers who used the
corporate form to own livestock that it would feed, because owning
livestock qualified as "engaging in farming or ranching" under Ne-
braska's law. 218
As above, there are sellers and buyers in this market, creating two
groups of competitors. The seller is the feedlot and the buyer is the
cattle owner. The feeding-services seller in Jones claimed that Ne-
braska's law restricted the consumption of its services. 2 19 That is, it
claimed that Nebraska's law affected the buyers in this market and,
thus, the seller by hindering its ability to serve those with economic
interests beyond the state's borders. Thus, within the two groups of
competitors in the feeding-services market, the burden fell on buyers
who could not utilize the feedlot's services. As amongst sellers, no
problematic distribution of burdens resulted. If anything, insider sell-
ers were burdened by the restriction on whom they could sell to.
Thus, the analytical focus needs to be on the buyers in this market. It
is there that the discriminatory burdens arguably fall, given the gen-
eral allocation the DCC doctrine cares about.2 20
218. NEB. CONST. art. XII, § 8(1) (defining farming or ranching). The mere ownership
of livestock as a restricted activity poses one complication in this market. I deal
with this prohibition on livestock ownership as a livestock-feeding problem be-
cause that is how the challenge arose. It could also be thought of as restricting
who could own livestock physically located in Nebraska feedlots. Conceptualized
as such, the restriction is no different than that imposed in the land market.
Insider-outsider status is likely determined using the buyer's residency and the
existence of discrimination turns on the correlation between state residency and
farm residency or active engagement.
There was no restriction on outsiders' ability to buy cattle that would be
shipped out of the state (i.e., there was no export ban), nor were insiders re-
stricted from buying cattle that would be shipped into the state but unrestricted
in their purchase of cattle already within the state (i.e., there was no import ban).
Thus, the land market and the feeding-services market adequately cover how Ne-
braska's corporate-farming measure affected participants in these different as-
pects of the livestock market.
219. To the extent feeding service sellers claimed discrimination in terms of the ability
to own or operate feeding-service facilities, the matter can be taken as affecting
the market for agricultural land or as affecting the ability to produce the service.
Such a claim is fully addressed within the other markets at issue.
220. One could object to the prospect of insider sellers asserting the rights of their
buyers to make out a violation of the DCC doctrine. The DCC doctrine, however,
allows sellers to raise constitutional claims on behalf of their buyers. See West
Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (striking down state law as
discriminatory against out-of-state milk producers, despite presence in litigation
of only milk dealers); S.D. Farm Bureau v. Hazeltine, 340 F.3d 583, 591-92 (8th
Cir. 2003) (using a particularly broad view of standing); TRIBE, supra note 7, at
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Among these buyers, the identification of insider-outsider status is
easier because of the nature of the market. In the feeding market, for
example with cattle, the animals often move. That point of origin can
be used to determine insider-outsider status for the buyers at issue.
Thus, if Nebraska's measure treated cattle coming from beyond the
state's boundary differently than cattle originating within the state's
boundary, then the measure would treat insiders and outsiders differ-
ently, with insider-outsider status determined by the originating loca-
tion of the cattle being sent to the feeder.
Even with such a method of detecting insider-outsider status, how-
ever, there is no discrimination. Under the operational view of the
farm, as above, no discrimination occurs because qualifying activities
could occur anywhere. For instamce, if a corporation had the requisite
ownership structure and performed the qualifying activities in Kan-
sas, it would be just as entitled to "engage in farming or ranching" in
Nebraska (i.e., place the cattle it owns in Nebraska feedlots for feed-
ing) as a Nebraska corporation that performed the required activities
in Nebraska. In other words, Kansas' corporate cattle owners could
buy the feeders' services on the same terms as Nebraska's corporate
cattle owners. No discrimination would follow.
One plaintiff in Jones, however, argued that this was not the case.
That feeder argued that outsider consumers were burdened in the
market for cattle feeding services because insider consumers were the
only ones who had access to the feedlot service while using a corporate
form. Thus, the argument went, outsiders could not compete on the
same terms as insiders in this market because only insiders could per-
form the qualifying activities.
The Jones court agreed with this plaintiff and concluded that out-
of-state qualifying actifities would not do the trick. But there is no
logical or textual reason to conclude that an outsider operation would
need to perform qualifying activities in Nebraska. An argument sup-
porting this reasoning could be premised on the narrow interpretation
of "the farm." That is, if Nebraska's law viewed the feedlot as a farm
upon which qualifying activities would have to be performed, then in-
siders perhaps would have better access to the Nebraska feeders' ser-
vices. But such an interpretation of Nebraska's law is nonsensical.
Few would argue that Nebraska's law required cattle owners to reside
on the Nebraska feedlot (the farm) that is feeding their cattle. And it
would be just as unreasonable to strictly construe the active engage-
ment requirements to require cattle owners who are having cattle fed
in Nebraska feedlots to visit the feedlot, feed the cattle, and engage in
the management of those cattle. After all, those activities are pre-
§ 6-6, at 1060 n.4 (noting standing questions); Heinzerling, supra note 176, at
246-47, 264-67 (criticizing the Court's lax standing requirements).
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cisely what the cattle owner hires the feedlot to do. Such a construc-
tion would markedly change the cattle-feeding industry and the
service it provides.
More importantly, the narrow interpretation of "the farm" proves
too much in this market. If "the farm" were construed narrowly as
applied to outsiders, it could not be construed in some other way for
their insider competitors. That is, if residency or active engagement
on the Kansas portion of the farming operation were insufficient, then
residency on a farming operation's farmland in Nebraska would be
similarly insufficient to qualify the Nebraska corporate cattle owner to
have its cattle fed in a Nebraska feedlot. Under this interpretation,
Nebraska's law would bar all corporate cattle-owners from buying
feeding services from Nebraska feedlots, insiders and outsiders alike.
No discrimination would follow.
The existence of cattle feeding operations in Nebraska feeding the
corporately owned cattle of others suggests the narrow interpretation
is wrong. At the very least, the narrow interpretation proves too much
in this market. Buyers of cattle feeding services can therefore be elim-
inated as a market in which discriminatory effects existed. Under any
construction of Nebraska's law, no discrimination existed for purposes
of the DCC doctrine among buyers of feeding services.2 2 1
IV. CONCLUSION
The effort at critiquing the validity of Nebraska's corporate farm-
ing measure under the DCC doctrine's discriminatory effects rule is
difficult and the Jones court's conclusion was more complex than it
appeared. As applied to feeding-service buyers, there was no cogniza-
ble discrimination. However, the effect of Nebraska's law among land
buyers and producers may have been discriminatory. To qualify as
such, however, Nebraska's law had to be interpreted narrowly with
regard to where the qualifying activities (residency and active engage-
ment) could occur and residency had to be invoked as the line that
separates insiders from outsiders. Even on those assumptions, a dis-
criminatory effect emerges only with regard to farm residency. Active
engagement remains sufficiently unclear in its impact under the
Court's DCC case law to either require a Pike type of review or to re-
quire evidence of actual effects within the relevant markets.
221. Even if the court's rejection of the operational view was unpersuasive in the cat-
tle feeding market, perhaps its narrow reading was correct for land buyers and
producers. This bifurcated reading of the term (broad for feedlot customers and
narrow for landowners and producers) would be difficult to anchor textually be-
cause Nebraska's law contained no distinction between feeding services and pro-
duction or landownership in relation to the qualifying activities or the location of
such activities. This suggests, of course, that the narrow interpretation was in-
correct for all markets.
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In reaching these conclusions, two primary doctrinal difficulties in
the DCC case law have emerged to complicate the analysis. First,
there is no clear rule with regard to who insiders and outsiders are.
Second, there is a great deal of uncertainty associated with what sorts
of allocations qualify as discriminatory for purposes of the DCC doc-
trine. A close look at the cases reveals some answers to the second
uncertainty. In most instances, the Court is unwilling to find discrim-
inatory effects where the impact is not clearly disproportionate. Two
further nuances emerge, however. At times, offsetting local benefits
can be used to nullify insider burdens, but this is insufficient to make
out a case of discriminatory effects when a significant portion of insid-
ers and outsiders remain burdened by a particular state law. The
Court has also been concerned about the longitudinal aspects of state
laws with respect to outsider entry. Neither of those nuances kill or
save Nebraska's corporate farming-measure.
In the end, then, states' ability to pursue farmer-oriented policy is
limited by the DCC doctrine. However, there is at least some room to
argue that state's may provide more favorable treatment for those in-
dividuals who are actively engaged in farming without meeting the
high standards that must be met under the discrimination rules of the
DCC doctrine. Matters are, of course, far from clear. But that, unfor-
tunately, is the nature of the doctrine.
